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A FAILURE OF REMEDIES 








“The lower the rate of a fraud’s detection, the higher the multiplier 
required to ensure that crime does not pay.” 
—Chief Judge Esterbrook 
United States v. Rogan (7th Circuit 2008) 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines the U.S. pharmaceutical industry and the harms 
imposed on individual patients and healthcare consumers—including private 
and government third party payers—from practices proscribed by Federal and 
State laws regulating marketing and pricing.
1
 
The Article pays particular attention to the False Claims Act (FCA), which 
has become the government’s primary civil weapon against fraudulent and/or 
wrongful conduct causing the expenditure of government dollars. 
Passed by Congress in 1863, and amended most recently in 2010, the FCA
2
 
allows the government to pursue an individual or entity that has filed, or 
caused to be filed, a “false or fraudulent” claim for payment with funds that in 
whole or in part came from the government. In addition to treble damages, the 
statute allows for civil penalties of between $5,000 and $11,000 for each 
“claim.” The FCA is unique in that it has a “qui tam” provision allowing 
 
 † This essay was prepared for the Remedies Discussion Forum, Paris, June 2015. We are grateful for the 
research assistance of Luciana Devisate and Chelsea Brewer. Authors also wish to thank Nicholas Torres and 
Nicole Fukuoka for their assistance on this essay. 
  Paul J. Zwier is a Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. 
  Reuben Guttman is a partner in the firm of Guttman, Buschner & Brooks, PLLC and a Senior Fellow 
and Adjunct Professor at Emory Law School. He has represented whistleblowers in cases against Abbott, 
Glaxco-Smith Kline, Pfizer, Amgen, Wyeth, Celgene, Pharmerica, Omnicare, and Community Health 
Systems. 
 1 This Article is written as a catalyst to encourage debate during the 2016 election year.  
 2 See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2012). In addition to the Federal False Claims Act, a 
number of states have passed their own False Claims Acts focusing on fraud on state and municipal funds. A 
list of the state FCA’s can be found at www.whistleblowerlaws.com. 
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private citizens to bring suit in the name of the government provided that their 
suit is not based on “public information” or, alternatively, that the individual 
bringing the suit is an “original source” of that information.
3
 
In United States v. Neifert-White Co.,
4
 the Court explained that the FCA is 
a “remedial statute” which “reaches beyond ‘claims’ which might be legally 
enforced to all fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay out sums of 
money.”
5
 Yet, to the extent that common law fraud requires proving the 
element of “reliance,” the FCA is actually more expansive than a fraud statute 
because it captures claims or statements made recklessly in furtherance of 




Generally, where Medicare and Medicaid payers reimburse for drugs that 
are marketed through misrepresentations about safety, efficacy, quantity or 
pricing, or where sales have been tainted by “kickbacks,” the Government may 
be entitled to recovery under the FCA.
7
 In other words, to the extent that a drug 
is “misbranded” under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA), redress is 
available under the FCA where the wrongful conduct caused the expenditure of 
government monies. 
In addition to treble actual damages, i.e. the amount of money expended for 
each prescription times three, the Government is entitled to a civil penalty for 




Under the Park Doctrine, theoretically, the government can seek prison 
sentences for those who are in charge of companies when these illegalities 
occur,
9
 however, these remedies are almost never invoked. In 2015, Deputy 
Attorney General, Sally Yates, issued the much-publicized “Yates Memo” 
 
 3 See, e.g., Vermont Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex Rel Stephens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000) 
(Explaining that because a qui tam ‘relator” is assigned a portion of the recovery as a bounty, the relator has 
met the U.S. Const. Article III “injury in fact” standing requirements). 
 4 United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228 (1968).  
 5 Id. 
 6 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Corp., 176 F.3d 776 (4th Cir. 
1999). 
 7 See infra text of Part II. 
 8 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012). 
 9 United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). 
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which encouraged a focus on the criminal and civil prosecution of corporate 
insiders who have steered their corporate ship on a criminal course.
10
 
Despite available remedies, the questions for legislators, regulators, 
candidates for office, and members of the media are: 1) whether available 
compliance enforcement mechanisms are being used and 2) whether proper 
remedies that have deterrent value are being imposed on both corporations and 
the individuals who run them. These are important questions because 
pharmaceutical fraud is a substantial drain on the economy and places citizens 
at physical peril. 
Historically, the lion’s share of settlements with drug manufacturers have 
involved significant cash payments and the institution of Corporate Integrity 
Agreements (CIA), but no admission of wrongdoing, no loss of patents, and no 
restrictions on the particular company’s ability to sell its drugs in the 
marketplace.
11
 There is neither disclosure of core documents, nor evidence 
unearthed during the investigation, which may help reset the market for honest 
medical information about a pharmaceutical product. The Office of the 
Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) indicated that it will be more aggressive in imposing different remedies, 
including lifetime bans on individuals and companies that engage in off-label 
marketing or other kickback schemes.
12
 This has not occurred, even though 
OIG also has issued guidelines regarding when it might revoke a patent, sell it, 
or otherwise take profits from the big companies.
13
 
To be fair, the blame does not rest solely with the Department of Justice 
(DOJ). In civil enforcement, the DOJ acts as the law firm for client agencies, 
including the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), which is a 
part of HHS. CMS implements the Medicare program through vendors and 




 10 See Sally Yates, Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE MEMO 
(Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download.  
 11 See generally infra note 147 (explaining the purpose and function of Corporate Integrity Agreements).  
 12 Office of Inspector Gen. et al., Practical Guidance for Health Care Governing Boards on Compliance 
Oversight, OIG.HHS.GOV (April 20, 2015), https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/compliance-guidance/docs/Practical-
Guidance-for-Health-Care-Boards-on-Compliance-Oversight.pdf; see also Office of Inspector Gen. et al., 
Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, OIG.HHS.GOV (April 2003), https://oig. 
hhs.gov/fraud/docs/complianceguidance/042803 pharmacymfgnonfr.pdf. 
 13 Id. 
 14 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, CMS.GOV 1, 8–9 (Dec. 10, 2010), https://www.cms. 
gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/LegislativeUpdate/Downloads/ PPACA.pdf (relating to 
Prescription Drugs).  
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or to monitor whether the vendors are making reimbursement payments in 
accordance with regulation.
15
 A glaring consequence of this inability is the 
payment for drugs for uses that are not medically supported. The question of 
whether the use—if not within the FDA approved indication—is medically 
supported, is another problem. CMS has by regulation identified private 
contractors—i.e. the ‘Compendia”—who are responsible for determining 
whether an off–label use is medically supported.
16
 These contractors often rely 
on industry paid doctors for guidance, as their conflicts of interest policies do 
not proscribe industry relationships.
17
 CMS has simply neglected to properly 
monitor Compendia publishers. 
Without a CMS’ handle on expenditures, the DOJ seems to have entered 
settlements absent any transparent damage models with the litmus test for 
fairness seemingly hinging on whether the settlement has the optics of 
deterrence. Unfortunately, when viewed from an historical context, remedies 
have had little impact on the behavior of the big pharmaceutical companies in 





 practices present a case study for determining whether 
agencies should use other remedies to bring about better behaviors and whether 
courts, in approving settlements, should exercise diligence in determining the 
applicability of remedies. The question is why traditional remedies have failed 
to provide the necessary deterrence and what practical solutions exist. This 
Article provides analysis of the problem and raises the prospect of long term 
and short term solutions which include: 
 
 15 Id.  
 16 Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Manual, CMS.GOV (Feb. 19, 2010), https://www.cms.gov/ 
Medicare/Prescription-Drug-Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/downloads/chapter6.pdf. 
 17 Avoiding Medicare Fraud & Abuse: A Roadmap for Physicians, CMS.GOV (July 2014), https://www. 
cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-
MLN/MLNProducts/Downloads/Avoiding_Medicare_FandA_Physicians_FactSheet_905645.pdf.  
 18 See infra text of Part II. 
 19 For a definition of Big Pharma, we use the criteria developed by SEBASTIAN HELD ET AL., IMPACT OF 
BIG PHARMA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ON R&D PRODUCTIVITY 17 (2009). (The criterion they use for 
defining Big Pharma are, pharmaceutical firms reaching at least $ 2 billion in sales a year, selling in at least 3 
dominant markets, US, Europe and Japan, ongoing R&D marketing efforts in a minimum of 5 separate 
therapeutic fields, and maintain completely integrated marketing operations including internal R&D, 
manufacturing, clinical, regulatory, marketing and sales. Using this criterion as of 2009, twelve companies fit 
the category: Pfizer, (leads the way with over $ 46 billion in sales and a 7.6 market share, in 2009), 
GlaxoSmithKline, Novartis, Sanofi-Aventis, Johnson & Johnson, AstraZeneca, Merck & Co, Roche, Abbot, 
Amgen, Wyeth, Lilly, (other at or just missing the $ 2 billion in sales and making up about 2% of the market 
are Bayer, Bristol Meyers Squibb, and Boehringer Ingelheim)). 
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 The promulgation of formal DOJ guidance on settlements with 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and others in the stream of 
commerce, including a requirement that Civil Penalties under the 
FCA not be waived; 
 The issuance of DOJ reports, which make public the facts and 
documents unearthed during investigations that result in 
settlements of cases that lacked the transparency of formal 
litigation; 
 The release, under the Freedom of Information Act, of all 
documents maintained by the FDA with regard to a drug or 
product that was the subject of a settlement of misbranding or 
kickback allegations; 
 Legislation allowing CMS to bargain with manufactures or to use 
price referencing systems—as exists in Europe and Canada—to 
lower the cost of drugs; 
 The imposition of criminal and civil penalties on corporate 
officials who oversee marketing activities that have the potential to 
place patients at peril; and 
 Complete oversight of CMS to analyze whether inherently public 
functions are imprudently privatized and whether functions 
properly performed by private vendors are monitored for 
compliance with regulatory obligations. 
Part 1 of this Article looks at the market for pharmaceuticals, its 
profitability, and its risks. It evaluates pricing of pharmaceuticals and the 
incentives in the market that seem to cause institutional behaviors that drive 
illegal conduct. In addition, it briefly examines why faith in the free market, 
which theoretically should moderate the behavior of actors out of fear that 
consumers will simply choose a different provider, fails in the case of 
pharmaceuticals. 
Part 2 of this Article examines the failures of the existing traditional 
remedies in the FCA and the related actions to adequately compensate, deter, 
and punish for Big Pharma’s illegality. In particular, it examines repeat 
offenders in the pharmaceutical market, and notes that the problem may lie 
most with companies without either real competition for their particular drugs, 
or a diversified portfolio of generic products as part of their offerings. It also 
examines the promise of CIAs to bring more integrity into the relationship of 
manufacturers and consumers. It questions why such agreements that contain 
promises—including that a court can ban companies that persist if they engage 
ZWIER_GUTTMAN GALLEYSFINAL 2/17/2016 11:43 AM 
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in future off-label marketing—have not been enforced in settlements with the 
DOJ. It also demonstrates how revoking a company’s patent can disrupt future 
patients’ ability to get the appropriate drugs they need, and as a result make the 
remedy unattractive. At least until the generic market can meet this need, the 
court may be hesitant to revoke the patent. It examines whether as a matter of 
remedies, the court should be empowered to count as damages future sales of 
the patented drug as a basis for deterring the fraudulent behavior. It illustrates 
how such remedies may run afoul of the Constitution. As a result, the company 
may bet that its ability to continue to sell the drug in its markets will make up 
for the risks it incurs in engaging in deceitful behavior in establishing the 
market in the first place. Without the ability to confiscate future profits as a 
remedy, it is unlikely that the behavior of Big Pharma will be significantly 
deterred, as the gains are too tempting, and chances that any one individual 
gets caught are too low. 
Finally, we conclude by proposing a combination of remedies and ask 
whether pricing regulation, either through CMS, or by allowing insurance 
companies to combine forces to negotiate lower price, needs to be a necessary 
part of these remedies to Big Pharma’s illegal practices. 
I. PHARMACEUTICALS, PROFITS AND RISKS 
Among corporations, pharmaceutical companies are unique. Their brand 
and reputation is premised on the notion that they cater to patients in perilous 
health by producing products that are safe and effective. Although not bound to 
the Hippocratic Oath taken by doctors who order their products through 
prescriptions, their brand implies the same level of obligation—“do no harm.” 
Yet the question of whether the patient is the customer is a murky matter; a 
doctor writes the prescription for a person whose bill is often paid by third 
parties, many of whom disperse federal and state health care dollars. 
Obligations to investors and efforts to maximize stock price for the benefit of 
corporate officers, desiring to cash in on stock options, are externalities driving 
unlawful behavior. And at an emotional level, there is undoubtedly the 
perception—on Wall Street and within the corporation itself—that no regulator 
is going to face the political backlash of jeopardizing the long-term viability of 
businesses manufacturing pills that prolong life. 
Against this backdrop, Big Pharma was able to fly under the radar with 
business practices placing consumers’ safety in jeopardy, while causing the 
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unnecessary expenditure of government health care dollars.
20
 The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation estimates that health care fraud costs American 
taxpayers $60 billion a year.
21
 Some estimates contend the Medicare program 
alone constitutes over $600 billion lost to fraudulent activity by the health care 
profession, generally, in the last ten years.
22
 Based on these numbers alone, it 
is astonishing that candidates for office and the journalists who pose the 
questions in debates have not made this a focal point for political discourse. 
As part of the settlements, many companies are required to enter into self-
policing agreements called CIAs.
23
 Notwithstanding their existence, repeat 
offenders are common, as in the case of companies including Abbott and 
Pfizer. 
With fraud unchecked, medical costs continue to rise far in excess of 
inflation.
24
 More troubling is that the increase in the cost of health care is 
mostly attributable to rising pharmaceutical prices.
25
 Dan Muro, a frequent 
contributor to Forbes magazine who closely follows health care costs, noted 
the following: 
An estimated 576,000 Americans spent more than the median 
household income on prescription medications in 2014. This 
population of patients grew an astounding 63% from 2013. Further, 
the population of patients with costs of $100,000 or more nearly 
tripled during the same time period, to nearly 140,000 people. The 
total cost impact to payers from both patient populations is an 




 20 See generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Settlement Agreement, JUSTICE.GOV (May 7, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2012/05/07/SettlementAgreement.pdf (indicating that the 
US brought a cause of action against Abbott, and Abbott must pay the United States a lump sum of money for 
violations of the FCA).  
 21 See Fixing the False Claims Act: The Case For Compliance-Focused Reforms, U.S. CHAMBER FOR 
LEGAL REFORM (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/research/fixing-the-false-claims-act-
the-case-for-compliance-focused-reforms [hereinafter Fixing the False Claims Act]. 
 22 Id.  
 23 See generally Settlements, supra note 23 (stating within the settlement agreement that Abbott agrees to 
enter into a Corporate Integrity Agreement); see infra note 147. 
 24 Dan Munro, Annual Healthcare Cost for Family of Four Now at $24,671, FORBES (May 19, 2015, 
11:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danmunro/2015/05/19/annual-healthcare-cost-for-family-of-four-
now-at-24671/ (discussing the increase in the average cost for families of four with employer-provided PPO 
insurance coverage and the annual increase in spending split by employer and employee portions). 
 25 Id.  
 26 Id. (quoting Glen Stettin, Super Spending: U.S. Trends in High-Cost Medication Use, EXPRESS 
SCRIPTS LAB (May 13, 2015), http://lab.express-scripts.com/insights/drug-options/super-spending-us-trends-
in-high-cost-medication-use). 
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. . .Across the board increases in prescription drug costs were cited as 
the primary cause for the higher total percentage increase in health 
care costs (6.3% this year versus 5.4% in 2014).
27
 
The rate at which prescription drug costs increased this year doubled 
over the average increase of the prior five years. This was driven by a 
combination of factors, including the introduction of new specialty 
drugs, a continued increase in compound drugs, and price increases 
for both brand name and generic drugs.
28
 
There is no evidence of rising overhead or tightened profit margins as 
causes for price escalation. The World Health Organization estimates that, 
worldwide in 2014, pharmaceutical companies scored in excess of $300 billion 
in profits; with profits headed to $400 billion over the next three years.
29
 
A look at Medicare disbursements provides insight into the problem. The 
total amount of Medicare reimbursement for pharmaceuticals in 2015 is 
estimated at $85 billion,
30
 or 14% of the total Medicare health care 
expenditures. These include both Medicare B plan reimbursements, (for drugs 
administered in an outpatient or hospital setting), and Medicare D plans, (for 
drugs outside the hospital setting).
31
 In the U.S., the free market sets the price 
for drugs except that the largest payer, Medicare, lacks statutory authority to 
bargain, let alone bargain collectively with other payers.
32
 Although Medicare 
has some leverage over what it pays (Medicare will only pay the price of the 
lowest cost generic, where generics exist, unless doctor provides 
justification
33
), it has little ability to negotiate down the cost of drugs. 
 
 27 Munro, supra note 26. 
 28 Scott A. Weltz, Christoper S. Girod & Susan K. Hart, 2015 Milliman Index, MILLIMAN (Dec. 22, 2015, 
9:15 PM), http://us.milliman.com/MMI/.  
 29 Trade, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy and Health: Pharmaceutical Industry, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story073/en/. 
 30 HHS FY2015 Budget in Brief, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., (June 4, 2014), 
http://www.hhs.gov/about/budget/fy2015/budget-in-brief/cms/medicare/index.html (explaining the distribution 
of Medicare into four parts including Part B ($167.8 billion gross fee for service spending in 2015) which pays 
for “physician, outpatient hospital, ESRD, laboratory, durable medical equipment, certain home health, and 
other medical services,” and Part D ($85.2 billion projected gross spending in 2015) which provides a 
“standard prescription drug benefit”).  
 31 Id.  
 32 Gina Kolata, Why Drugs Cost More in the US (May 24, 1991), N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1991/05/24/business/why-drugs-cost-more-in-us.html?pagewanted=all.  
 33 How Do I Appeal if I Gave Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage?, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www. 
medicare.gov/claims-and-appeals/file-an-appeal/prescription-plan/prescription-drug-coverage-appeals.html. 
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When one examines the costs by type of drug and compares this with what 
one who needs the drug has to pay outside the U.S., one can see how the 
unregulated market for drugs in the U.S. makes for run-away pricing.
34
 High 
prices are in place for most categories of drugs sold in the U.S. From cancer 
drugs to pain-killers,
35
 cholesterol lowering drugs to nasal sprays, drugs for 




Although there are features of the production and patenting of 
pharmaceuticals that make drugs costly to produce, in contrast to publicly 
regulated utilities that also have a government sanctioned monopoly, the same 
transparency is lacking with regard to expenditures or stranded costs. Against 
this backdrop, the industry claims that the testing and FDA approval process 
often eats up 10-12 of the 20 years that the owner has the exclusive ability to 
sell the drug.
37
 This leaves 8 to 10 years for the owner to recoup costs before 
generic competition for a successful drug will start. One wonders why then that 
drug prices, even after generics hit the market, remain so high in the U.S. Why 
doesn’t competition from generics eventually moderate the cost of drugs? 
There are a number of reasons. Medicare Part B prescriptions make up a 




 34 Thom Hartmann, 11 Major Drug Companies Raked in $85 Billion Last Year, and Left Many to Die 
Who Couldn’t Buy Their Pricey Drugs, ALTERNET (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.alternet.org/11-major-drug-
companies-raked-85-billion-last-year-and-left-many-die-who-couldnt-buy-their-pricey (focusing on the pricing 
differences for two common drugs, Nexium and Lipitor, between the United States and various other countries 
in the developed world).  
 35 David H. Howard, Peter B. Bach, Ernst R. Berndt, & Rena M. Conti, Pricing in the Market for 
Anticancer Drugs, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES VOL. 29 NO. 1,    –         , http //dspace.mit.edu/openaccess-
disseminate/    . /      (“We find that the average launch price of anticancer drugs, adjusted for inflation 
and health benefits, increased by 10 percent annually—or an average of $8,500 per year—from 1995 to 
2013.” . 
 36 Id. 
 37 Dennis S. Fernandez et. al., The Interface of Patents with the Regulatory Drug Approval Process and 
How Resulting Interplay Can Affect Market Entry, IP HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES fig.1 (2007), 
http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/ch10/p09/ (describing typical time periods for drug development after 
patent). The article includes the following assertions:  
If you ask executives at America’s top pharmaceutical drugs about the high costs of prescription 
drugs, they’ll tell you that high and increasing drug prices are needed to sustain research and 
development efforts. But numerous studies have debunked those claims.  
For example, one study, by the group Families USA, found that America’s major drug companies 
are spending more than twice as much on marketing, advertising and administration than they do 
on research and development. The report also found that the total profits of America’s top 
pharmaceutical companies far exceed their research and development costs. Id.  
 38 Id. 
ZWIER_GUTTMAN GALLEYSFINAL 2/17/2016 11:43 AM 
50 EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW [Vol. 3 
prescriptions are covered by multiple plans and payers.
39
 The non-generic 
manufacturer also is taking advantage of the physician’s presumptive ethical 
responsibilities to prescribe without regard to price.
40
 In addition, with many 
pharmaceuticals, the patient has little say regarding what he or she pays. They 
may have little information as to the cost, or they may think they do not have a 
choice; with cancer drugs to heart medications, failure to take the drugs 
appears to be life threatening. Moreover, Big Pharma engages in repackaging 
its drugs in strategies that allow it to extend the life of its drug, often in 
collusion with some generic manufacturers.
41
 
Finally, antitrust law allows a certain amount of collusion among label and 
generic manufacturers of drugs.
42
 In order to incentivize the making of 
generics, a company can submit its application for a generic of a name brand 
drug to the FDA, subject to the Orange Book listing of the name brand drug, in 
the time leading up to name brand drug’s expiration. The name brand 
manufacturer must look at the formula and determine if it wants to attempt to 
extend the patent through a supplement or improvement to the existing patent. 
It can extend the life of the drug by adding features or new methods of 
delivery. In the process the two can agree to “split up the market” for the drug 
between them, to insure some spaces to continue to sell the drug under 
different advertising campaigns.
43
 As a result, generics end up costing more in 
the U.S. than elsewhere, where the price may be regulated and physicians 
continue to prescribe the name brand because they are either confused, worried 
about the generics being lower quality, or sticking with what works, as 
opposed to taking risks with the alternatives.
44
 
The combination of the uncertain line between extortion and free market 
pricing by supply and demand, the unique nature of the health care need for 
certain drugs, the ability of companies to get patents for their drugs, the 
collusive relationship between named brand manufacturers and generic 
 
 39 Id. 
 40 Arnold S. Relman, Cost Control, Doctors’ Ethics, and Patient Care, ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY, http://www.issues.org/19.4/updated/relman.pdf. See also 42 C.F.R. § 405.517 (2015) (basing 
medicare allowances for physician reimbursement of drugs to physicians based on a percentage of the overall 
cost of the drug). 
 41 The Editorial Board, Sneaky Ways to Raise Drug Profits, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/08/opinion/sneaky-ways-to-raise-drug-profits.html?_r=0. 
 42 See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013). 
 43 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Amendments), 
FDA (July 29, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/testimony/ucm115033.htm. 
 44 The FDA provides the cover for these agreements. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 
(2013). 
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manufacturers, the responsibility of doctors for prescribing the drug, and the 
inability of insurance companies to collectively bargain for price all adds up to 
a system that routinely gouges society in the prices it pays for its drugs.
45
 
II. REMEDIES UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT, THEIR FAILURE TO 
ADEQUATELY COMPENSATE AND DETER BIG PHARMA’S BEHAVIOR 
The need to deter Big Pharma’s fraud by actors cloaked by the cover of 
large institutional unanimity remains a major challenge for the U.S. brand of 
free market democracy where the government is a both a regulator and a payer 
for care.
46
 The temptation to commit fraud by big institutions that do business 
in mass markets for goods—while focusing on maximizing profits and 
growing shareholder value each year—has always been great,
47
 but it is 
particularly acute where that business provides life-saving drugs.
48
 Cost 
sensitivities of individual consumers are absent, the physician 
intermediary/pharmaceutical coinsurer is often forbidden by medical ethics to 
take account of the costs, and hospitals often are more than willing to mark-up 




 45 See Robert H. Ballance, Market and Industrial Structure, in CONTESTED GROUND: PUBLIC PURPOSE 
AND PRIVATE INTEREST IN THE REGULATION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 95, 103–04 (Peter Davis ed., 1996); see 
also David J. Gross, et al., Prices for Prescription Drugs: The Roles of Market Forces and Government 
Regulation, in CONTESTED GROUND: PUBLIC PURPOSE AND PRIVATE INTEREST IN THE REGULATION OF 
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS, 124, 134 (Peter Davis ed., 1996); Patricia M. Danzon, Pharmaceutical Price 
Regulation: National Policies Versus Global Interests,THE AEI PRESS 1, 3–4 (1997), http://www.aei.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/-pharmaceutical-price-regulation-global-interests_11361924090.pdf. 
 46 Merrill Matthews, Medicare and Medicaid Fraud Is Costing Taxpayers Billions, FORBES (May 31, 
2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/merrillmatthews/2012/05/31/medicare-and-medicaid-fraud-is-costing-
taxpayers-billions/ (discussing former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder estimated Medicare and Medicaid 
fraud is between 60-90 billion a year).  
 47 Reuben Guttman & Traci Buschner, Commentary: Give Big Pharma a Dose of Strong Regulatory 
Medicine, MARKETWATCH (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/patients-suffer-from-drug-
industrys-chronic-greed-2013-08-07 (explaining that almost every major pharmaceutical manufacturer has 
been sanctioned either civilly, criminally, or both for unlawfully marketing their drugs); see also James 
Mcnair, The Kickback, Fraud and Drug-Switch Claims That Ail a Louisville Pharmacy Company, KENTUCKY 
CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (May 21, 2015), http://kycir.org/2015/05/21/the-kickback-fraud-and-
drug-switch-claims-that-ail-a-louisville-pharmacy-company/ (explaining that the drug maker Abbott 
Laboratories paid rebates to get pharmacy companies to pump up prescriptions of an anti-seizure drug to 
agitated dementia patients in nursing homes).  
 48 In the case of life-saving drugs, patients are told that they have little choice. Thus, the patients are 
willing to take the risk. In the case of psychopharmacological drugs, it is difficult to measure ethics and safety 
concerns; thus, the risk is not immediately measurable.  
 49 Barry Werth, A Tale of Two Drugs, MIT TECH. REV. (October 22, 2013), http://www. 
technologyreview.com/featuredstory/520441/a-tale-of-two-drugs/. 
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Perhaps the reason is confusion in the actors’ mind between market place 
pricing that is set by supply and demand, and behavior that is condemned as 
extortion, or at the very least exorbitant in nature. Where someone extorts 
$1,000 for a loaf of bread to a starving person, or $500 for a glass of water to a 
person dying of thirst, the exorbitant nature of the pricing is plain. Where the 
price is $100,000.00 for a cancer saving drug, the outrage may be the same, but 
the nature of the market might cover its extortive characteristics in the 
language of supply and demand. The “free market” has a difficult time in 
restricting pricing that takes advantage of one’s illness. What further 
exacerbates the dilemma is that existence of insurance (and its mixed motive—
the more it pays, the more it can charge
50
) often makes the cost of the drug 
hard to discover. Moreover, HHS is forbidden in the U.S. from bargaining 
collectively with pharmaceutical companies for lower costs for drugs.
51
 
Despite the fact that Medicare and Medicaid at one time only reimbursed at the 
price point of the lowest priced generic, private insurers were incentivized 
against negotiating similar restrictions on what they/it pays.
52
 Individual 
insurers are immune from antitrust regulations for collusive bargaining over 
drugs and can engage in pricing agreements with pharmaceutical companies 
that result in higher prices of drugs on the market.
53
 Even though the Veterans 
Administration (VA) pays approximately 40 percent of what the private 
insurance companies pay for the same drugs, U.S. law is protective of its “free 
market” and forbids collective bargaining, out of fear that lower prices may 




 50 See How Rates are Determined, OHIO DEP’T INS., https://www.insurance.ohio.gov/Newsroom/Pages/ 
Howratesaredetermined.aspx (last visited Oct. 25, 2015).  
 51 According to Senator Amy Klobuchar, “Under current law, only individual insurance companies can 
negotiate Medicare drug prices. The pharmaceutical industry has tried to reassure Americans that this will 
inevitably produce the lowest prices because of competition. This explanation is unconvincing. Evidence and 
experience show us that the present system often does not produce the fairest prices. The pharmaceutical 
companies like to say that Part D Program costs are lower than projected, but beating artificial projections has 
not resulted in lower prices. Numerous studies show that Part D prices are significantly higher than prices for 
drugs and programs where negotiation is permitted.” 153 CONG. REC. S4, 641 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2007) 
(statement of Sen. Klobuchar). 
 52 Caryn Beth Gordon, Predatory Pricing - Collusion Between Insurers and Drug Companies, 7 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 60 (1995). See generally Judy Whalley, Priorities 
and Practices - The Antitrust Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 569 (1988); 
Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Economic Concepts and Antitrust 
Analysis: A Critical Reexamination Analyzing Anticompetitive Exclusion, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 71, 74 (1987). 
 53 Id.  
 54 Kai Rugerri & Ellen Nolte, Pharmaceutical Pricing; The Use of External Reference Pricing (2013), 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR240/RAND_RR240.pdf (comparing 
European and US pharmaceutical company profits). 
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Curiously, there is some question as to what Big Pharma actually means 
when it says it puts money into research and development. Is it putting money 
into studies or trials that will develop data to be submitted to the FDA to secure 
a new or expanded indications or to meet post marketing requirements, or is it 
developing data to be used to support journal articles that will be used to spin 
off label messages causing revenue to be secured from uses outside the FDA 
approved indication? In other words, are purported Research and Development 
monies really just expenditures in furtherance of illegal marketing goals as 
opposed to legitimate regulatory requirements? 
The chance of making huge short-term profits with impunity seems to 
overwhelm a decision-maker’s calculation of the consequential harm his or her 
decision may cause and overwhelms his or her calculation of the risks of 
getting caught.
55
 The harm caused can be nonetheless significant and the need 
for strategies of adequate deterrence an important societal priority. 
There are three areas in particular where the willingness of institutions to 
defraud by ignoring health care costs in their pursuit of profits seems to be on 
the rise. The first is in the area of misbranding and its subcategory, off-label 
marketing, which is a violation of the FDCA redressable under the FCA. The 
second is the provision of kickbacks to physicians for prescribing or 
recommending their drugs. The third are strategies with generic companies to 
enter into settlements that divide up the market for a particular drug and keep 
the overall cost of the drugs higher than what can be justified by the drugs’ 
benefits. In the first two cases, the institutions are engaged in Medicare fraud 
as they charge the public for products of questionable benefit or for uses that 
raise significant safety concerns.
56
 The number and size of these cases have 
increased to such an extent that the government itself seems almost complicit 
 
 55 Though Big Pharma stands out in its continuous choice to put greed over risk of harm, it is not the only 
industry often overwhelmed by such greed. See, e.g., US v. Bernard L. Madoff and Related Cases, THE 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, http://www.justice.gov/usao-
sdny/programs/victim-witness-services/united-states-v-bernard-l-madoff-and-related-cases (cases involving 
securities fraud); Ben Protess & Michael Corkery, 5 Big Banks Expected to Plead Guilty to Felony Charges, 
but Punishments May Be Tempered, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/14/ 
business/dealbook/5-big-banks-expected-to-plead-guilty-to-felony-charges-but-punishments-may-be-
tempered.html (fraud in the banking industry); Peter J. Henning, Many Messages in the G.M. Settlement, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/business/dealbook/many-messages-in-the-gm-
settlement.html?_r=0 (product defects in mass manufactured goods). 
 56 See Justice Department Recovers $3.8 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2013, 
DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-38-billion-false-
claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2013; A Roadmap for New Physicians: Fraud & Abuse Laws, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH 
& HUM. SERVS., http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physician-education/01laws.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2015). 
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in the illicit behavior.
57
 The subject institutions pay enormous fines in 
settlement, so the government drops the cases.
58
 Most troubling, however, is 
that often the institutions continue their activities—defrauding the markets and 
the government and paying the fines simply as a cost of doing business.
59
 
The available data from the organization, the Project on Government 
Oversight, Pogo.org/DOJ.org, supports the claim that pharmaceutical 
companies have not been deterred by the large fines imposed by the DOJ and 
perhaps consider any amount they might pay for liability as the cost of doing 
business. 
A survey of settlements between the Justice Department and Big Pharma 
since 2009, in excess of $75 million, provides plenty of troubling examples. 
We take our reports of cases and settlements from the following sources: 
Justice News, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/justice-news; 
and, PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT, http://www.pogo.org (survey by 
research assistant of Justice Department reports, and POGO listings.)
60
 
Settlements between pharmaceutical companies and the Justice department 
since 2009 consisting—time of publication—of $75 million or more: 
Company Name, Drug Name, Settlement, Date 
1. GlaxoSmithKline, Paxil, and Wellbutrin, $3 billion, 2012 
2. Pfizer, Bextra, $2.3 billion, 2009 
3. Abbott Laboratories, Depakote, $1.5 billion, 2012 
4. Eli Lilly, Zyprexa, $1.4 billion, 2009 
5. Amgen, Aranesp, $762 million, 2012 
 
 57 See Evan Albright, Medicare Reports Fraud And Waste Grew In 2013 After Years Of Decline, FORBES 
(Dec. 20, 2013, 3:50 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insidepatientfinance/2013/12/20/medicare-reports-
fraud-and-waste-grew-in-2013-after-years-of-decline/. 
 58 See Kelly Kennedy, Drugmakers Have Paid $8 Billion in Fraud Fines, USA TODAY, http:// 
usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2012-03-05/health-drugmakers-fraud-fines/53372792/1 (last 
updated Mar. 6, 2012, 8:43 AM). 
 59 See Austin B. Frakt, Steven D. Pizer & Roger Feldman, Should Medicare Adopt The Veterans Health 
Administration Formulary?, 21 HEALTH ECONOMICS 485 (2012), available at http://www.readcube.com/ 
articles/10.1002%2Fhec.1733?r3_referer=wol&tracking_action=preview_click&show_checkout=1&purchase
_referrer=onlinelibrary.wiley.com&purchase_site_license=LICENSE_DENIED. 
 60 Founded in 1981, POGO originally worked to expose outrageously overpriced military spending on 
items such as a $7,600 coffee maker and a $435 hammer. In 1990, after many successes reforming military 
spending, including a Pentagon spending freeze at the height of the Cold War, POGO decided to expand its 
mandate and investigate waste, fraud, and abuse throughout the federal government. Throughout its history, 
POGO’s work has been applauded by Members of Congress from both sides of the aisle, federal workers and 
whistleblowers, other nonprofits, and the media. See generally, About POGO, http://www.pogo.org/about/. 
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6. GlaxoSmithKline, Kytril/Bactroban/Paxil CR/Avandamet, $750 
million, 2010 
7. Allergan, Botox, $600 million, 2010 
8. AstraZeneca, Seroquel, $520 million, 2010 
9. Ranbaxy Laboratories, Gabapentin, $500 million, 2013 (Indian) 
10. Novartis, Trileptal, $423 million, 2010 
11. Merck, Vioxx, $322 million, 2011 
12. Forest Laboratories, Levothroid, Celexa, Lexapro, $313 million, 
2010-off-label promotion 
13. Dey Pharma, Albuterol Sulfate/Albuterol MDI, Cromolyn 
Sodium/Ipratropium Bromide, $280 million, 2010—False Claims 
Act over reported prices—or getter payment rates 
14. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Rapamune, $256.4 million, 2013-off-label 
promotion 
15. Johnson and Johnson, Topamax, $81 million, 2010 
16. Johnson and Johnson, Risperdal/Invega/Natrecor, $2.2 billion, 
2013-off-label promotion 
17. Endo Pharmaceuticals, Lidoderm, $171.9 million, 2014 
18. Sanofi, Hyalgan, $109 million, 2012 (French) 
19. Elan, Zonegran, $203.5 million, 2010 
20. Boehringer Ingelheim, Aggrenox, Atrovent/Combivent, Micardis, 
$95 million, 2012 
A list of pharmaceutical companies that have been penalized multiple times 
by the DOJ since 2001 follows. This partial list includes information compiled 
from Pogo.org and DOJ.org. POGO is an independent watchdog organization 
that describes itself as follows: 
Company 
























J&J and its subsidiaries, 
Janssen Pharmaceuticals and 
Scios Inc., paid $2.2 billion to 
resolve criminal and civil 
liability arising from 
allegations relating to the 
prescription drugs Risperdal, 
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(Natrecor) 
 
Invega and Natrecor, 
including promotion for uses 
not approved as safe and 
effective by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) 
and payment of kickbacks to 
physicians and to the nation’s 
largest long-term care 
pharmacy provider. In 
addition to monetary 
sanctions, this settlement 
placed J&J under a five-year 
CIA. 
 







Net profit was 
reported after the 
settlement 
payout. This 
amount was a 
4% increase over 
the prior year 
(2000). 
TAP Pharmaceutical, a 
subsidiary of Abbott 
Laboratories and Takeda 
Industries, set and controlled 
the price at which the 
Medicare program reimbursed 
physicians for the prescription 
of Lupron by reporting its 
average wholesale price 
 “AWP” . The AWP reported 
by TAP was significantly 
higher than the average sales 
price TAP offered physicians 
and other customers for the 
drug. The Government 
alleged that TAP marketed 
the spread between its 
discounted prices paid by 
physicians and the 
significantly higher Medicare 
reimbursement based on 
AWP as an inducement to 
physicians to obtain their 
Lupron business. The 
Government further alleged 
that TAP concealed the true 
discounted prices paid by 
physicians from Medicare, 
and falsely advised physicians 
to report the higher AWP, 
rather than their real 
discounted price for the drug. 
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The Government further 
alleged that TAP set its AWPs 
of Lupron at levels far higher 
than the price for which 
wholesalers or distributors 
actually sold the drug, 
resulting in falsely inflated 
prices that were neither the 
physician’s actual cost nor the 
true wholesaler’s average 
price. As part of this 
settlement, TAP agreed to 
comply with the terms of a 
sweeping CIA which changes 
the manner in which TAP 
supervises its marketing and 
sales staff, and ensures that 
TAP will report to the 
Medicare and Medicaid 
programs the true average 
sale price for drugs 











In July 2003, Abbott 
Laboratories, Inc., entered 
into a $600 million combined 
criminal and civil resolution 
of allegations against its Ross 
Products division relating to 
the manner in which it 
marketed its enteral feeding 
products. According to the 
complaint, Abbott was 
counseling DME suppliers to 
submit “bundled” claims to 
the Medicare program for 
feeding pumps and tubing. 
The bundled claims resulted 
in two products being billed 
as a single product at a higher 
price than if billed separately. 
As part of the settlement, 
Abbott entered into a five-
year CIA. 
 
2010 Fraudulent $126 million Abbott agreed to pay 
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$126,500,000 for reporting 
false and inflated prices for 
numerous pharmaceutical 
products. The actual sales 
prices for the products were 
far less than what Abbott 
reported. The difference 
between the resulting inflated 
government payments and the 
actual price paid by 
healthcare providers for a 
drug is referred to as the 
“spread.” The larger the 
spread on a drug, the larger 
the profit for the health care 
provider or pharmacist who 
gets reimbursed by the 
government. The government 
alleges that Abbott created 
artificially inflated spreads to 
market, promote and sell 
dextrose solutions, sodium 
chloride solutions, sterile 











Kos Pharmaceuticals, a 
subsidiary of Abbott 
Laboratories, paid more than 
$41 million to resolve 
criminal and civil liability 
arising from conduct relating 
to its drugs Advicor and 
Niaspan. Specifically, the 
civil settlement resolves 
allegations that Kos offered 
and paid doctors, other 
medical professionals, 
physician groups and 
managed care organizations, 
illegal kickbacks in the form 
of money, free travel, grants, 
honoraria and other valuable 
goods and services, in 
violation of the Anti-
Kickback Statute to get them 
to prescribe or recommend 
Niaspan and Advicor. 
ZWIER_GUTTMAN GALLEYSFINAL 2/17/2016 11:43 AM 
2016] THE CASE OF BIG PHARMA 59 
In addition, the United States 
contends that Kos promoted 
the sale and use of Advicor 
for use as first-line therapy for 
management of mixed 
dyslipidemias (a disruption of 
the lipids in the blood). Such 
an off-label use was not 
approved by the Food and 
Drug Administration nor was 
it a medically-accepted 
indication for which the 
United States and state 
Medicaid programs provided 
coverage for Advicor. As part 
of the settlement, Kos has 
entered into a deferred 
prosecution agreement. The 
DOJ agreed to enter into a 
deferred prosecution 
agreement with Kos based in 
part on the company’s 
undertaking of a thorough 
internal investigation of 
misconduct; its reporting of 
information from the 
investigation to the 
department on a regular basis; 
its continued and ongoing 
cooperation with the 
department’s investigation of 
the matter; and in recognition 
of the remedial measures 






$5. 12 Billion 
Abbott agreed to pay $1.5B to 
resolve its criminal and civil 
liability arising from the 
company’s unlawful 
promotion of the prescription 
drug Depakote for uses not 
approved as safe and effective 
by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA). The 
company misbranded 
Depakote by promoting the 
drug to control agitation and 
aggression in elderly 
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dementia patients and to treat 
schizophrenia when neither of 
these uses was FDA 
approved. In addition to the 
criminal and civil resolutions, 
Abbott also executed a CIA. 
The five-year CIA requires, 
among other things, that 
Abbott’s board of directors 
review the effectiveness of 
the company’s compliance 
program, that high-level 
executives certify to 
compliance, that Abbott 
maintain standardized risk 
assessment and mitigation 
processes, and that the 
company post on its website 
information about payments 
to doctors. Abbott is subject 
to exclusion from federal 
healthcare programs, 
including Medicare and 
Medicaid, for a material 
breach of the CIA and subject 
to monetary penalties for less 
significant breaches 
2013 Kickbacks $5,475,000 
2013 2.6 Billion 
Abbott knowingly paid 
prominent physicians for 
teaching assignments, 
speaking engagements and 
conferences with the 
expectation that these 
physicians would arrange for 
the hospitals with which they 
were affiliated to purchase 
Abbott’s carotid, biliary and 
peripheral vascular products. 
Glaxo Smith Kline    
2003 Fraudulent 
Pricing 
87.6 million GSK agreed to pay the 
government a civil fine of 
$87.6 million for failing to 
give the Medicaid program 
the lowest price charged to 
any consumer for anti-
depressant Paxil and nasal 
allergy spray Flonase. GSK 
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was accused of hiding its 
lowest prices from Medicaid 
by repackaging or relabeling 
its products under a 
middleman’s name, who then 
sold them at a deep discount 
not reported to the 
government. 
2004 Failure to 
disclose side 
effects 
2.5 million GSK suppressed the results of 
studies which failed to prove 
Paxil’s effectiveness and 
which suggested a possible 
increased risk of suicidal 
thoughts and acts in certain 
individuals. GSK was further 
alleged to have failed to 
disclose this information in 
medical information letters it 
sent to physicians. 
2005 Fraudulent 
Pricing 
150 million GlaxoSmithKline paid over 
$150 million to settle 
allegations of fraudulent drug 
pricing and marketing of the 
anti-emetic drugs Zofran and 
Kytril. GSK allegedly 
engaged in a scheme to set 
and maintain inflated prices 
for Zofran and Kytril. The 
government also alleged GSK 
engaged in a “double 
dipping” billing scheme with 
respect to Kytril by 
encouraging customers to 
pool leftover vials of Kytril to 
create an extra dose, which 
would then be administered to 










its Avandia diabetes drug as a 
new “wonder drug” that 
would reduce cardiovascular 
risks for diabetics at a time 
when studies found that 
Avandia significantly 
increased cardiovascular 
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10 Million The state of Hawaii settled 
with dozens of 
pharmaceutical companies, 
including GlaxoSmithKline, 
which were accused of 
gouging Hawaii’s Medicaid 
program for more than a 
decade by fraudulently 







GlaxoSmithKline agreed to 
pay $3,750,000 to settle 
allegations of deceptive or 
false marketing of the anti-
nausea drugs Kytril and 
Zofran. The complaint alleged 
that GSK improperly inflated 
the average wholesale price 





750 million SB Pharmco Puerto Rico Inc., 
a subsidiary of 
GlaxoSmithKline, agreed to 
plead guilty to felony charges 
relating to the manufacture 
and distribution of certain 
adulterated drugs made at 
GSK’s, now closed, Cidra, 
Puerto Rico, manufacturing 
facility. The resolution 
included a criminal fine and 
forfeiture totaling $150 
million and a civil settlement 
under the FCA for $600 
million. The drugs, 
manufactured at the plant 
between 2001and 2005, 
included Kytril, Bactroban, 
Paxil CR and Avandamet. 




$40.75 million GlaxoSmithKline agreed to 
pay nearly $41 million to 
settle charges that the 
company tried to sell drugs 
made in a Puerto Rican plant 
that failed to meet 
manufacturing standards. The 
attorneys general alleged that, 
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between 2001 and 2004, 
GlaxoSmithKline and its SB 
Pharmco Puerto Rico 
subsidiary engaged in unfair 
and deceptive practices when 
they manufactured and 
distributed certain lots of 
Kytril, Bactroban, Paxil CR, 
and Avandamet, produced in 











$3 Billion GlaxoSmithKline agreed to 
plead guilty and to pay $3 
billion to resolve its criminal 
and civil liability arising from 
the company’s unlawful 
promotion of Paxil, 
Wellbutrin and Avandia, its 
failure to report certain safety 
data, and its civil liability for 
alleged false price reporting 
practices. From April 1998 to 
August 2003, GSK 
unlawfully promoted Paxil for 
treating depression in patients 
under age 18, even though the 
FDA has never approved it 
for pediatric use. From 
January 1999 to December 
2003, GSK promoted 
Wellbutrin, approved at that 
time only for Major 
Depressive Disorder, for 
weight loss, the treatment of 
sexual dysfunction, substance 
addictions and Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder, among other off-
label uses. Between 2001 and 
2007, GSK failed to include 
certain safety data about 
Avandia, a diabetes drug, in 
reports to the FDA that are 
meant to allow the FDA to 
determine if a drug continues 
to be safe for its approved 
indications and to spot drug 
safety trends. Between 1994 
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and 2003, GSK and its 
corporate predecessors 
reported false drug prices, 
which resulted in GSK’s 
underpaying rebates owed 
under the Medicaid Drug 
Rebate Program. GSK also 
executed a five-year CIA. 
Pfizer    
2002 Fraudulent 
Pricing 
$49 Million In October 2002, Pfizer and 
its subsidiaries Warner-
Lambert and Parke-Davis 
paid $49 million to resolve 
FCA charges that it had 
fraudulently avoided paying 
rebates owed to state and 
federal health programs by 
failing to report best prices for 




$420 million In 1993, the FDA approved 
Neurontin solely for anti-
seizure use by epilepsy 
patients. However, Warner-
Lambert, a Pfizer subsidiary, 
aggressively marketed 
Neurontin for a variety of 
other treatments, including 
bipolar disorder (even though 
scientific studies had shown 
that a placebo worked better 
for this disorder), none of 
which had been approved by 
the FDA. As part of the 
settlement agreement, Pfizer 
also agreed to enter into a 
CIA with the Department of 




$2.3 Billion Pfizer and its subsidiary 
Pharmacia & Upjohn 
(Pharmacia) promoted the 
sale of Bextra for uses and at 
dosages the FDA specifically 
declined to approve for safety 
reasons. Under the terms of 
this settlement, Pfizer entered 
into a five-year CIA. 
2010 Fraudulent $8.2 million The state of Hawaii settled 
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Pricing with dozens of 
pharmaceutical companies, 
including Pfizer, which were 
accused of gouging Hawaii’s 
Medicaid program for more 
than a decade by fraudulently 





$14.5 Million Pfizer illegally marketed 
Detrol, a drug for the 
treatment of overactive 
bladder, for use in male 
patients suffering from benign 
prostatic hypertrophy and 
several allied conditions, 
notably lower urinary tract 
symptoms and bladder outlet 
obstruction—all uses for 
which the FDA had not 
approved the drug as safe and 
effective. Since August 2009, 
Pfizer has been under a CIA 
with the Department of 
Health and Human Services, 
which remains in effect. 
2012 Foreign 
Bribery 
$15 Million Pfizer agreed to pay a $15 
million penalty to resolve an 
investigation of Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 
violations. Pfizer admitted 
that between 1997 and 2006, 
it paid more than $2 million 
of bribes to government 
officials in Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Kazakhstan and Russia in 
order to improperly influence 
government decisions in these 
countries regarding the 
approval and registration of 





$55 million Protonix is a proton pump 
inhibitor (PPI) that was used 
by physicians to treat various 
forms of gastro-esophageal 
reflux disease (GERD). 
Wyeth, a Pfizer subsidiary, 
sought and obtained approval 
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from the FDA to promote 
Protonix for short-term 
treatment of erosive 
esophagitis—a condition 
associated with GERD that 
can only be diagnosed with an 
invasive endoscopy. 
However, the government 
alleges that Wyeth fully 
intended to, and did, promote 
Protonix for all forms of 
GERD, including 
symptomatic GERD, which 
was far more common and 
could be diagnosed without 
an endoscopy. In addition, 
Wyeth allegedly promoted 
Protonix as the “best PPI for 
night-time heartburn.” even 
though there was never any 
clinical evidence that Protonix 
was more effective than any 
other PPI for night-time 
heartburn. Since August 2009, 
Pfizer has been under a CIA 
with the Department of 
Health and Human Services, 





$490.9 million Wyeth Pharmaceuticals Inc., a 
pharmaceutical company 
acquired by Pfizer Inc. in 
2009, agreed to pay $490.9 
million to resolve its criminal 
and civil liability arising from 
the unlawful marketing of the 
prescription drug Rapamune 
for uses not approved as safe 
and effective by the U.S. 
FDA. Rapamune is an 
immunosuppressive drug that 
prevents the body’s immune 
system from rejecting a 
transplanted organ. In 1999, 
Wyeth received approval 
from the FDA for Rapamune 
use in renal (kidney) 
transplant patients. However, 
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Wyeth encouraged sales force 
members, through financial 
incentives, to target all 
transplant patient populations 
to increase Rapamune sales. 
Sanofi-Aventis    
2007 Fraudulent 
pricing 
$190.4 million Aventis Pharmaceuticals 
agreed to pay $190.4 million 
“to resolve allegations that the 
company caused false claims 
to be filed with Medicare and 
other federal health programs 
as a result of the company’s 
alleged fraudulent pricing and 
marketing of drugs.” The case 
involved the pricing between 
1997 and 2004 of Anzemet, a 
treatment given to cancer 
patients after chemotherapy. 
The government alleged 
Aventis engaged in a scheme 
to set fraudulent and inflated 
prices for Anzemet. As part of 
the settlement, Aventis agreed 
to enter into a CIA that will 
require the company to report 
accurate average sales prices 
and average manufacturers’ 
prices for its drugs. 
2009 Fraudulent 
pricing 
$95 million Aventis Pharmaceutical Inc., 
a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Sanofi-Aventis, agreed to pay 
the United States $95.5 
million to settle allegations 
that it violated the FCA by 
misreporting drug prices in 
order to reduce its Medicaid 
Drug Rebate obligations. The 
settlement resolves 
allegations that between 1995 
and 2000, Aventis and its 
corporate predecessors 
knowingly misreported best 
prices for the steroid-based 
anti-inflammatory nasal 
sprays Azmacort, Nasacort 
and Nasacort AQ. In order to 
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avoid triggering a new best 
price that would obligate it to 
pay millions of dollars in 
additional drug rebates to 
Medicaid, Aventis entered 
into “private label” 
agreements with the HMO 
Kaiser Permanente that 
simply repackaged Aventis’ 
drugs under a new label. As a 
result, Aventis underpaid drug 
rebates to the Medicaid 
program and overcharged 
certain Public Health Service 
entities for these products. 
2012 Kickbacks $109 million Sanofi-Aventis agreed to pay 
$109 million to resolve 
allegations that Sanofi US 
violated the FCA by giving 
physicians free units of 
Hyalgan, a knee injection, in 
violation of the Anti-
Kickback Statute, to induce 
them to purchase and 
prescribe the product. The 
settlement also resolves 
allegations that Sanofi US 
submitted false average sales 
price (ASP) reports for 
Hyalgan that failed to account 
for free units distributed 
contingent on Hyalgan 
purchases. 




$762 million Aranesp is an erythropoiesis-
stimulating agent (ESA) that 
was approved by the FDA at 
certain doses for certain 
patient populations suffering 
from anemia. Amgen illegally 
misbranded Aranesp by 
promoting it for “off-label” 
doses that the FDA 
specifically rejected and for 
an “off-label” treatment that 
the FDA never approved. For 
example, Amgen illegally 
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promoted Aranesp to treat 
anemia caused by cancer, 
irrespective of whether the 
patient had been prescribed 
chemotherapy—a use for 
which Aranesp was never 
approved. In fact, in 2007, the 
FDA mandated that a “black 
box” warning be added to 
Aranesp’s label stating that 
when administered to certain 
target levels Aranesp 
“increased the risk of death” 
in patients with cancer who 
were not receiving 
chemotherapy or radiation. 
Further, Amgen offered 
illegal kickbacks to a wide-
range of entities in an effort to 
influence health care 
providers to select its 
products for use, regardless of 
whether they were 
reimbursable by federal 
healthcare programs or were 
medically necessary. As part 
of the global settlement, 
Amgen also agreed to enter 
into a CIA. 
2013 Kickbacks $24.9 million The settlement resolves 
allegations that Amgen paid 
kickbacks to long-term care 
pharmacy providers Omnicare 
Inc., PharMerica Corporation 
and Kindred Healthcare Inc. 
in return for implementing 
“therapeutic interchange” 
programs that were designed 
to switch Medicare and 
Medicaid beneficiaries from a 
competitor drug to Aranesp. 
The government alleged that 
the kickbacks took the form 
of performance-based rebates 
that were tied to market-share 
or volume thresholds. The 
government further alleged 
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that, as part of the therapeutic 
interchange program, Amgen 
distributed materials to 
consultant pharmacists and 
nursing home staff 
encouraging the use of 
Aranesp for patients who did 
not have anemia associated 
with chronic renal failure. 
2013 Kickbacks $15 million Xgeva, which is the brand 
name of the drug Denosumab, 
was approved by the FDA in 
late 2010 for use with certain 
cancer patients undergoing 
chemotherapy. It is most 
commonly prescribed for 
patients with metastatic bone 
disease in order to prevent 
skeletal-related adverse 
events. 
In order to increase sales of 
Xgeva, Amgen used data 
purchase agreements—which 
the company called the “Deep 
Dive” contracts—to provide 
financial incentives to 
oncologists and urologists to 
prescribe Xgeva. The original 
plan for the Deep Dive 
contracts called for Amgen to 
pay doctors to fill out a short 
survey on the Internet on how 
they were treating patients 
with bone cancer, including 
which drugs were used—
whether or not Xgeva was 
prescribed. However, Amgen 
altered the original Deep Dive 
program design by increasing 
the amount of money it would 
pay doctors, and by offering 
such payments only to doctors 
who prescribed Xgeva for 
their patients. Amgen’s 
Xgeva marketing team also 
was not supposed to know the 
identities of the doctors who 
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received Deep Dive contracts, 
but team members had access 
to that information. 
Additionally, in a further 
effort to influence doctors to 
prescribe Xgeva, Amgen 
provided cash payments 
characterized as honoraria to 
oncologists and urologists for 
participating in audience 
response sessions, data 
market research surveys, and 
“treatment trends” advisory 
board programs which touted 
the benefits of Xgeva. 




$650 million Merck was accused of 
violating the Medicaid Rebate 
Statute in marketing its 
cholesterol drug Zocor, its 
prescription pain medication 
Vioxx, and its anti-heartburn 
drug Pepcid. Merck allegedly 
offered hospitals large 
discounts for all three 
products if hospitals used 
them instead of competitors’ 
brands. The law requires 
companies to sell drugs to 
Medicaid at the best price 
they offer to any customer, 
but in this instance Merck did 
not offer similar discounts to 
Medicaid. Merck was also 
alleged to have induced 
physicians to use its products 
through the payment of illegal 
kickbacks. Merck also entered 
into a five-year Corporate 
Integrity Agreement with the 
Department of Health and 




$69 million The settlement resolved 
allegations that Warrick 
Pharmaceuticals, a subsidiary 
of Merck deliberately inflated 
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the Average Wholesale Prices 
(AWPs) of the asthma drug 
Albuterol. Since 2004, 
Schering has been operating 
under a CIA that addresses 
Schering’s pricing of its drugs 
to government programs. 
2010 Fraudulent 
pricing 
$31 million Schering-Plough, a subsidiary 
of Merck, and the state of 
Missouri settled a lawsuit in 
which the state accused the 
company of inflating prices 
for the drugs it sold to 
pharmacies participating in 
Missouri’s Medicaid program. 
2010 Fraudulent 
pricing 
$27 million Schering, a subsidiary of 
Merck, agreed to pay the 
United States and the state of 
Texas $27 million to settle 
allegations of health care 
fraud. It was alleged that 
Schering subsidiary Warrick 
submitted false pricing 
information and caused 
providers to submit 
fraudulently inflated 
reimbursement claims to the 
state and federally funded 
Texas Medicaid program for 
drugs used to treat asthma and 
other respiratory conditions. 
2010 Fraudulent 
pricing 
$28 million The state of Hawaii settled 
with dozens of 
pharmaceutical companies, 
including Merck, which were 
accused of gouging Hawaii’s 
Medicaid program for more 
than a decade by fraudulently 




$950 million  
Merck agreed to pay to 
resolve allegations regarding 
off-label marketing of Vioxx 
and false statements about the 
drug’s cardiovascular safety. 
Between May 1999 and April 
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2002, Merck promoted the 
drug for treating rheumatoid 
arthritis before that use was 
approved by the FDA. 
Further, Merck was accused 
of making inaccurate, 
unsupported, or misleading 
statements about Vioxx’s 
cardiovascular safety in order 
to increase sales of the drug 
and making false statements 
to state Medicaid agencies 
about the cardiovascular 
safety of Vioxx. As part of the 
settlement, Merck agreed to 
enter into an expansive CIA. 
2011 Fraudulent 
pricing 
$24 million Merck agreed to settle a 
lawsuit accusing Merck of 
knowingly reporting inflated 
prices to industry price 
reporting services between 
1995 and 2003. The lawsuit 
alleged that Merck reported 
false and inflated prices for 
three albuterol products, a 
drug used to treat asthma and 
other respiratory diseases. 
2011 Kickbacks $44.3 million 
 
Each company’s annual 
shareholder report revealed not 
a single company reported a 
loss. On the contrary, the 
reported annual net profit is 
often double or triple the 
amount of the one-time fine. 
For example, in 2003, Abbott 
settled for a lawsuit over the 
fraudulent pricing of its feeding 
tubes for $600 million. That 
same year, Abbott’s enteral 
nutrition division reported 
profits of almost $3 billion. 
Similarly, the year Abbott 
agreed to pay $1.5 billion for 
the off-label marketing of 
Depakote, its specialty division 
reported a profit of over $5 
billion. 
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III. MISCONDUCT SETTLEMENTS (REPEAT OFFENDERS) 
While the size of the fines imposed by the DOJ seem large in total dollars, 
they are dwarfed by the revenue streams attributable to unlawful behavior. 
First, most settlements under the FCA only account for the expenditure of 
Medicare, Medicaid, Tricare, and VA dollars. Damages incurred by state, 
municipal health, and welfare funds are excluded even though they are actually 
encompassed by some state FCAs. This occurs presumably because State 
Attorney Generals who receive an FCA complaint delegate the investigation to 
the National Association of Medicaid Fraud Control Units (NAMFCU), which 
is the body that coordinates State Attorney General Investigation of FCA 
cases. NAMFCU, as it is known, does not concern itself with investigating 
non-Medicaid damages. Second, to the extent the FCA only encompasses 
public payers, damages incurred by private payer—including Taft-Hartley 
Health and Welfare Funds—are also left out of settlements. 
The data available strongly supports the claim that large pharmaceutical 
companies have handled large fines as the price of doing business, but it also 
suggests that neither the fines, nor the CIAs, have altered their behavior. 
Fourteen companies can be categorized as repeat offenders including Johnson 
and Johnson and GlaxoSmithKline.
61
 All have had to pay multiple settlements 
stemming from similar allegations: fraudulent pricing, payment of kickbacks, 
and/or off-label marketing.
62
 All of those settlements are in the millions of 
dollars and most of the settlements are significantly greater than $100 million. 
Despite the size of the settlements, it appears that all companies are still 
reporting large net-profit gains.
63
 
The overall problem is compounded by an important public perception 
issue: in a down economy, if big players appear immune to thorough 




 61 See, Sammy Almashat et al., Rapidly Increasing Criminal and Civil Monetary Penalties Against the 
Pharmaceutical Industry: 1991 to 2010, PUB. CITIZEN (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.citizen.org/documents/ 
rapidlyincreasingcriminalandcivilpenalties.pdf (one of the authors of the report, Sidney Wolfe, MD, is a 
member of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory 
Committee). See also Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee Roster, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Drugs/ Drug Safety and Risk 
Management Advisory Committee/default.htm (last updated Dec. 16, 2015).  
 62 Id. See infra note 90. 
 63 See Richard Anderson, Pharmaceutical Industry Gets High on Fat Profits, BBC NEWS (Nov. 6, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28212223. 
 64 Katrice Bridges Copeland, Enforcing Integrity, 87 IND. L.J. 1033, 1061 (2012). 
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Isn’t the public justified in thinking that the government is complicit in not 
holding the major players fully accountable? 
In most cases, actions are brought under the False Claims Act; initially 
investigated and filed by whistleblowers; the U.S. intervenes, and then the 
cases are disposed of when the government enters into a civil settlement.
65
 
Although these cases are technically about the misspending of government 
monies, the subtext is always medical necessity and by implication patient 
safety. While these cases involve matters of public concern, they are filed 
under seal so that the DOJ can conduct an investigation. As a practical matter, 
the DOJ uses the seal process to investigate and to negotiate a settlement using 
the fruits of the investigation. Often—as in the case with billion dollar 
settlements involving Abbott, Pfizer, and Johnson and Johnson—the settlement 
is announced absent any public litigation. The medical community is left 
without a full understanding of the derelictions while the investor community 
is told that the corporation has placed its wrongful conduct behind. An analysis 
of Big Pharma settlements indicates that settlements have little or no impact on 
market capitalization and/or may even give the market a confirmation that 
because the wrongdoing is a thing of the past, the company is worth more.
66
 
A. The False Claims Act
67
 
The False Claims statute is a statute with a long history. Enacted during the 
Civil War, its initial focus was on military contractors that cheated the 
government. Most often these cases were brought against contractors that had 
sold shoddy goods or failed to deliver services or products according to 
specification. While the Federal False Claims Act is designed to capture the 
loss of federal dollars, a number of states, and some cities, have their own 
statutes, which can be used to capture the loss of state and municipal monies.
68
 
Under the FCA, the essential elements are as follows: The FCA imposes 
civil liability upon “[a]ny person” who, among other things “knowingly 
presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or 
 
 65 See Reuben Guttman & Jennifer Williams, Controlling Government Contractors: Can the False 
Claims Act be More Effective?, 14 SEDONA CONF. J. 1 (Sept. 2013) [hereinafter Controlling Government 
Contractors]; see, e.g., GSK, Enforcement Officials Finalize $3B Settlement, 21 NO. 6 FDA ENFORCEMENT 
MANUAL 3 (Food & Drug Admin., Silver Spring, Md.), Aug. 2012, at 3. 
 66 See Controlling Government Contractors, supra note 68.  
 67 The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2012). 
 68 See www.whistleblowerlaws.com for a complete list.  
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approval.”
69
 The term “claim” has a broad definition to include any effort to 
seek money that in whole or in part comes from the government; it can include 
efforts to secure payment from private vendors who are using government 
monies, as well as efforts to defraud foreign governments that are making 
purchases with, for example, foreign military assistance dollars.
70
 
B. Types of Illegal Behaviors by Pharmaceuticals 
Over the course of its illustrious 100 years plus history, the types of cases 
brought under the FCA have expanded. Pharmaceutical manufacturers, for 
profit education companies, military contractors, Department of Transportation 
(DOT) and Department of Energy Contractors (DOE) have all been targets of 
FCA litigation. Prior to 2001, the largest recoveries under the FCA were 
secured in litigation against the oil industry over schemes to cheat the 
government out of royalties from oil and gas recovered from federal leases.
71
 
Yet, the overall recovery against the nation’s largest oil producers, including 
Shell and Chevron, was a collective $300 million. 
With the turn of the century, and the enactment of Medicare Part D in 2003, 
DOJ targeted health care fraud as a priority. This can explain one reason for 
the popularity of the FCA as a weapon against healthcare. However, perhaps 
there is another reason—one that is less obvious and routed in a common 
denominator among health care cases. The largest recoveries under the FCA 
have come against health care targets that benefit from government monies 
through non-direct procurement relationships. There is an inference to be 
drawn from this. In a direct procurement case, an allegation of wrongdoing 
implicates not only wrongdoing by the contractor but also an oversight error by 
the contracting officer. In a non-direct procurement case, there is no 
government official who is immediately at fault. Nor is there a government 
official who is capable of defending or protecting the contractor. 
1. Kick-backs 
Violation of the Anti-Kickback (AKS) statute,
72
 a criminal law, is a per se 
violation of the FCA.
73
 In addition to the Attorney General, a private 
 
 69 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012).  
 70 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2) (2012).  
 71 See, e.g. U.S. ex rel. Johnson v. Shell, 33 F. Supp. 2d 528 (E.D. Tex. 1999).  
 72 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012).  
 73 See U.S ex rel. Brown v. Celgene Corp., No. 10-3165, 2014 WL 3605896 at *3 (C.D. Ca. July 10, 
2014).  
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whistleblower may seek civil redress under the FCA alleging a predicate 
violation(s) of the anti-kickback statute. 
The AKS is broadly written to proscribe payments made for the purpose of 
causing the “ordering” or “recommending” of a product or service that is paid 
for under a Federal healthcare program. The key to investigation lies in 
understanding that payments are often disguised as compensation for services 
that may be legitimate or have the appearance of being legitimate. A number of 
circuits have determined that if one purpose of the payment is unlawful, the 
arrangement violates the statute.
74
 The following are examples of AKS 
violations: (1) fees to refer patients for services or to use products, (2) rebates 
paid by manufacturers to Long Term Care (LTC) pharmacies or Pharmacy 
Benefit Managers (PBM), and (3) gifts, trips, or products given to those—
including doctors and nurses—who can order or recommend ordering a 
product. Within the orbit of suspect relationships are industry sponsored 
promotional speaker programs where Key Opinion Leaders are identified to 
give pre-packaged presentations for which they receive handsome 
compensation. These relationships are particularly suspect—and have a high 
capability of poisoning the market for honest medical information—when the 
speakers are chosen with the input of company marketers. Often, no attention 
is given to the actual medical qualifications of the speaker; when the return on 
investment analysis correlates speeches with sales, speakers will be rewarded 
with additional lucrative opportunities and travel. 
2. Misbranding 
Misbranding is also a predicate to violation of the FCA. Under the 
FDCA,
75
 a drug is misbranded if its labeling “is false or misleading.” Labeling 
is construed broadly to mean not only the package insert that comes with the 
drug, but also statements, handouts, press releases or any communication about 
or used to promote the drug. The FDCA precludes the “introduction or delivery 
for introduction into interstate commerce of any food, drug, device, [. . .] or 
cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded.”
76
 
A form of misbranding is off-label marketing, or marketing a drug for 
purposes that are outside the drug’s approved indication. The term “indication” 
refers to what specific disease state the drug is approved to treat; the dosing; 
 
 74 See, e.g., U.S. v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 72 (3rd Cir. 1985).  
 75 See 21 U.S.C. § 352 (2012).  
 76 See 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2012).  
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whether the drug is to be used as a mono therapy or in conjunction with other 
specific drugs; and the ages of the patients who will be given the drug. The 
indication—found on the package insert—is the result of analysis of data 
providing information on safety and efficiency. While a manufacturer is not 
allowed to market its drug for off-label purposes, a doctor is free, on his or her 
own, to prescribe a drug for off-label use.
77
 In theory, doctors do so because 
they have read the literature, understand the mechanism of action, understand 
the potential side effects, and have looked at the viability and availability of 
on-label treatments. 
Understanding that doctors can legally write prescriptions for off-label use, 
manufacturers have historically engaged in off-label promotion arguing that 
sales exceeding any projections for on-label use were the result of doctors 
making their own decisions absent company influence. 
To avoid detection, and to create plausible deniability once accused, 
companies have engaged in at least facially neutral conduct to drive unlawful 
behavior and results.
78
 For example, manufacturers drive their sales 
representatives to push off-label uses by paying them bonuses on both off-label 
and on-label use. Manufacturers also encourage their sales representatives to 
challenge doctors to try a drug in place of a competitor’s product, which may 
have a different indication. Manufacturers also may arm their sales force with 
publications that are often the result of undisclosed company sponsored 
publications strategies. Once in the hands of the sales representative, he or she 
will “cherry pick” certain passages in convincing a doctor that there is indeed 
basis for use of the drug off-label. 
Off-label marketing escalates prescription writing, and is dangerous, 
because it is a strategy premised on spin and not science. While the industry 
argues that there is a First Amendment Right to engage in off-label 
marketing,
79
 speech that is false or misleading is not protected and, as a 
practical matter, it is virtually impossible to engage in a pervasive off-label 
effort without false representations. 
 
 77 Certain drugs, such as growth hormones, cannot be prescribed for off-label purposes.  
 78 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (applying to the FCA as a primer in 
corporations driving unlawful behavior through facially neutral programs). 
 79 See U.S. v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 161 (2nd Cir. 2012) (arguing that Caronia was never found to have 
conspired to place false or deficient labeling on a drug).  
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3. Inflating the Price of Pharmaceuticals 
In some instances, Medicare and Medicaid determine the price doctors 
receive as reimbursement for certain medications prescribed based upon a 
figure known as the Average Sales Price (ASP), calculated based on reports by 
the drug manufacturers.
80
 The Act provides for civil monetary penalties for any 
manufacturer’s misrepresentations of ASP data.
81 
The Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services (the Secretary) has the authority to 
adjust the ASP for a drug if the Secretary finds that the ASP does not 
accurately reflect actual market prices.
82
 Manufacturers have manipulated the 
Average Wholesale Price (AWP) in an effort to induce pharmacists and 
pharmacies to promote and prescribe their drugs but physicians claim the 
spread did not cover the actual costs of administering the drugs.
83
 Under the 
2003 Act, the physician is now reimbursed for 106% of the cost of the drug.
84
 
What remained was a way for the actual price that pharmacies and physicians 
pay for a drug to be substantially less than what the government will reimburse 
them for. This is referred to in the pharmaceutical world as “marketing the 
spread.”
85
 This results in a bad debt or deduction, when the higher price is not 
paid, and serves to lower the amount that the company may have to declare as 
income.
86
 The need for government monitoring of these costs is crucial to the 
 
 80 Anna Kraus, Ellen Flannery, & Peter Safir, Average Wholesale Price Reform Provisions of the 
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, COVINGTON & BURLING (Dec. 11, 
2003), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2003/12/oid9743.pdf. The ASP is computed 
using included sales divided by the number of units sold. The Act excepts certain sales from inclusion in the 
computation of ASP, including (a) sales exempt from inclusion in the determination of “best price” under 
section 1927(c)(1)(C)(i) of the Social Security Act, and (b) “such sales as the Secretary identifies as sales to an 
entity that are merely nominal in amount.” H.R. 1 § 303(c)(1), adding new section 1847A to the Social 
Security Act. Rebates and discounts include “volume discounts, prompt pay discounts, cash discounts, free 
goods that are contingent on any purchase requirement, chargebacks and rebates (other than rebates under 
section 1927).” For years after 2004, the Secretary may include “other price concessions . . . that would result 
in a reduction of the cost to the purchaser.” Id.  
 81 Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 303(c), 86 Stat. 1329, 1484; Social 
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1847A(8)(c)(d)(4) (1935).  
 82 42 U.S.C. § 1847A(8)(c)(d)(4) (2012). 
 83 Medicare Part B Drug Average Sales Price, CSV.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-
for-Service-Part-B-Drugs/McrPartBDrugAvgSalesPrice/index.html?%20redirect=/McrPartBDrugAvgSales 
PRice/10_VaccinesPricing.asp (last updated March 30, 2015). 
 84 See Patrick Mullen, The Arrival of Average Sale Price, 4(3) BIOTECHNOL.HEALTHC. 48, 48-53 (Jun. 
2007), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3541838/. 
 85 Pharmaceutical Fraud, FALSE CLAIMS ACT RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.falseclaimsact.com/ 
common-types-of-fraud/pharmaceutical-fraud (last visited Jan. 13, 2015).  
 86 Topic 453 – Bad Debt Deduction, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc453.html 
(last updated Dec. 30, 2015). 
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calculation of the ASP to accurately reflect the free market change as opposed 
to the initial price that is set by the drug manufacturer. 
C. Remedies Under the False Claims Act 
Assessing damages to the government is not a straightforward analysis 
because the government engages in procurement for its direct benefit and for 
the benefit of citizens. Whenever procurement misdeeds occur, the government 
must bear the burden of any long-term impact, as in the case of providing care 
for patients who have been injured by drugs prescribed for purposes outside 
the FDA’s approved labeling. 
While the damage scenarios are complicated, the FCA provides a simple 
statement about damages. The defendant is liable for treble damages and a civil 
penalty of between $5,500 and $11,000 per claim.
87
 This simple provision 
raises some important questions about how claims are to be counted, and also 
how damages are to be calculated. This is especially true as to calculating the 
figure for the treble penalty that should be imposed. Is the amount trebled the 
amount of money the U.S. paid for the good, or is it only the lost benefit to the 
U.S. that counts in the calculation? What happens if the contract involves 
certified functional bulletproof vests according to design specification but, 
instead, the specifications were not met? Would the answer to the previous 
question change if soldiers were killed because of defective vests? What if 
financial fraud injured the market more generally? If the fraud caused a 
financial liability far greater than any harm to the U.S. government directly? 
Can the U.S. take into account broader market injury when calculating the 
harm done by a fraudulent defendant? These are all questions of interest that 
must be addressed. 
While current provisions of the FCA impose treble damages and civil 
penalties of up to $11,000 per claim on violators under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a), 
there is some debate as to whether consequential damages to compensate the 
government for the costs associated with rectifying the false claims should be 
permitted as well. Since the Act itself does not expressly address the issue of 
consequential damages, it is left to the courts to interpret the statute and award 
damages accordingly. 
 
 87 The False Claims Act: A Primer, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, (Apr. 22, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/sites/ 
default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf. 
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Significantly, no settlement agreement executed by the DOJ has broken 
down actual or “straight line” damages, or set forth whether that number has 
been multiplied. Moreover, no settlement sets forth the amount—if any—paid 
in civil penalties. To the contrary, in securing settlements, it has been the 
government’s position to wave civil penalties and seek less than treble actual 
damages. 
1. Compensatory Damages 
As noted above, the FCA imposes treble damages on violators.
88
 Under 31 
U.S.C. § 3729(a), the classification of treble damages as either purely 
compensatory or including punitive element is far from an exact science; “the 
tipping point between payback and punishment defies general formulation, 




In Cook County v. U.S. ex rel. Chandler, the Court clarified that although 
the FCA’s treble damages remedy “is still punitive,” the treble damages 
provision “does not equate with classic punitive damages” where the jury has 
open ended discretion to determine punitive damages.
90
 In FCA cases, the jury 
determines actual damages and the actual damage number is later trebled by 
the Court.
 91
 The Court in Cook County also noted that the trebling accounts for 




2. Are Consequential Damages Available under the FCA? 
The next question is whether consequential damages may be awarded under 
the FCA. A look at the history of the Act and the Congressional legislative 
record discussing the 1986 Amendments to the FCA is fundamental in 
answering this question. In considering whether consequential damages may 
be awarded, it is critical to understand exactly what actions are deemed 
unlawful by the FCA, and therefore, form the basis for calculating the award 
amount. As discussed above, prior to the 1986 Amendments, the FCA imposed 
double damages and a $2,000 per claim civil penalty.
93
 In the Aerodex case, 
 
 88 Id. 
 89 Cook County v. U.S. ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 130 (2003).  
 90 Id.  
 91 Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 786 (2000). 
 92 Cook County, 538 U.S. at 130. 
 93 See Vt. Agency of Natural Res., 529 U.S. at 769. 
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the Court stated that the unlawful “act” which violates the FCA is the actual 
submission of a false claim for payment.
94
 The Court distinguished the action 
of filing the false claim for payment from the action of not delivering the 
product that the Defendant was contractually obligated to deliver (Defendant 
delivered faulty ball bearings for aircraft engines).
95
 Based on that assertion, 
the Court denied recovery of any consequential damages, reasoning “the 
language of the False Claims Act does not include consequential damages 
resulting from the delivery of defective goods . . . the submission of these 
vouchers was not the cause of the Government’s consequential damages.
96
 The 
delivery and installation of the bearings in the airplanes, not the filing of the 
false claims, caused the consequential damages.”
97
 
The passage of the 1986 Amendments to the FCA, and just as importantly 
the legislative history surrounding it, provide a rather strong answer to the 
FCA consequential damages question. During the legislative session in which 
the Amendments to the FCA were discussed, the Senate passed a version of the 
bill including treble damages plus consequential damages, while the House’s 
version included double damages plus consequential damages.
98
 Senator 
Grassley then offered an amendment with treble damages, but deleted any 
mention of consequential damages, explaining that the House and the Senate 
had met and agreed to this version of the bill to reconcile their differences.
99
 
This version of the bill was passed into law, resulting in the FCA containing no 
overt guidance as to the availability of consequential damages. 
The omission of consequential damages in the final version of the 1986 
Amendments to the FCA, after their initial inclusion in both the House and 
Senate bills, has led courts to conclude that they are not an available remedy. 
The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the “FCA does not expressly 
provide for the consequential damages that typically come with recovery for 
fraud.”
100
 With consequential damages seemingly unavailable as a remedy, 
courts have been forced to look elsewhere to accomplish the driving purpose 




 94 United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 1011. 
 98 Brian C. Elmer & Andy Liu, “Because of”: FCA Damages and Penalties, CROWELL & MORING, 
https://www.crowell.com/documents/Because-of_FCA-Damages-and-Penalties.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2016). 
 99 132 CONG. REC. S15515 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
 100 Cook County, 538 U.S. at 131. 
 101 United States ex rel. Roby v. Boeing Co., 79 F. Supp. 2d 877, 892 (S.D. Ohio 1999). 
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With this framework in place, the next question must be: what measure of 
damages will make the government whole? The Roby court answered: 
“damages awarded under the False Claims Act typically are calculated to 
ensure that they ‘afford the government complete indemnity for the injury done 
it.’”
102
 When analyzing what damages were caused by the unlawful “act,” the 
Court stated that damages “must be determined by the application of proximate 
causation and foreseeability.”
103
 It would therefore be advantageous for those 
filing actions on behalf of the government under the FCA to establish a strong 
connection of foreseeable harm that resulted from the Defendant’s submission 
of a false claim. 
3. Civil Penalties under the FCA 
As discussed above, treble damages are not the only remedy provided by 
the FCA. Violators of the Act are subject to a fine of between $5,000 and 
$11,000 per claim submitted.
104
 One purpose of this penalty is to reimburse the 
government for the time and money associated with handling the false 
claim.
105
 In calculating this amount, the courts look at the conduct of the 
person from whom the government intends to collect the forfeitures, and the 
fine is then applied to each false claim submitted, not the number of 
false/defective products or shipments.
106
 
One of the reasons why the FCA has been unable to deter institutional 
greed is because the statute’s damages provisions are read in the light of the 
context of civil fraud, where damages are tied to the harm that has been done 
to the individual who has been relying on the statements that have been 
made.
107
 Where the U.S. government is the one harmed, U.S. citizens, 
taxpayers, and those directly affected by the goods purchased or sold, are all 
 
 102 Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Compton v. Midwest Specialties, 142 F.3d 296, 304 (6th Cir. 1998); 
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549 (1943). 
 103 Roby, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 892. 
 104 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012). 
 105 United States v. Woodbury, 359 F.2d 370, 378 (9th Cir. 1966).  
 106 Id. at 387; United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 529 (1976). 
 107 The Federal Drug Administration published guidelines for determining sanctions for pharmaceutical 
company misbehavior. Specifically, the FDA said the criteria include whether: 1) the violation involves actual 
or potential harm to the public; 2) the violation is obvious; 3) the violation reflects a pattern of illegal behavior 
or failure to heed prior warnings; 4) the violation is widespread; 5) the violation is serious; 6) the quality of the 
legal and factual grounds supports prosecution; and 7) the proposed prosecution is a prudent use of agency 
resources. Inspections, Compliance, Enforcement, and Criminal Investigations, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresManual/ucm176738. 
htm (last updated June 19, 2015).  
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harmed by the fraud. Part of the problem, where the U.S. acts for those 
harmed, is whether they should rely on the secondary market: lawsuits by those 
directly injured by the fraud, or whether the U.S. should be seen as an 
intervener on behalf of the individual victims, to create a fund to compensate 
those injured by the fraud. What are the chances that individuals will sue, or 
that plaintiff’s class action lawsuits will be brought, or that criminal penalties 
and jail time will also be imposed? In other words, it falls to the U.S. attorney 
to be the advocate for the U.S., not only as an institution, but also for the 
society as a whole.
108
 This is particularly true in cases where the harm is the 
violation of a regulation written into a contract solely for the benefit of 
citizens. Classic examples include compliance with Department of Labor 
regulations. 
By an objective standard, the monetary consequences have been great for 
violating the FCA. According to publically available data, well over $19 
billion has been collected from pharmaceutical companies.
109
 The Department 
of Justice has represented that it has recovered fifteen dollars for every one 
 
 108 Tobacco litigation teaches us how this works. The settlements with states were supposed to 
compensate the state’s Medicare and Medicaid funds or county governments funds that will be drawn against 
in the future because of the fraud perpetrated on the public by the tobacco industry. See Cezary Podkul & 
Claire Kelloway, Investors Haul In Nearly Half the Tobacco Settlement Cash, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 11, 2014, 
8:00 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/investors-haul-in-nearly-half-the-tobacco-settlement-cash. 
The chart below shows Prohibited Behaviors Under the FCA and the amount paid per category of behavior.  
 
 
Sammy Almashat & Sidney Wolfe, Pharmaceutical Industry Criminal and Civil Penalties: An Update, 
PUBLIC CITIZEN (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.citizen.org/documents/20731.pdf. 
 109 See, Pharmaceutical Fraud, FALSE CLAIMS ACT RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.falseclaimsact.com/ 
common-types-of-fraud/pharmaceutical-fraud (last visited on Feb. 10, 2016). 
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dollar that it costs to prosecute these companies.
110
 Of course, these settlements 
are not measured or contrasted with the unlawful revenue stream that flowed 
from the proscribed behavior. The optics, unfortunately, have created a 
dynamic where the press and legislators conducting oversight have not been 
incentivized to ask hard questions. 
In addition to monetary damages, theoretical consequences include 
exclusion from government programs. The effect of exclusion is that 
pharmaceutical companies and physicians will receive absolutely no payments 
made by any Federal health care program for any products or services 
performed.
111
 “The scope of an exclusion under Title    of the Social Security 
Act is from all Federal healthcare programs, including Medicare, Medicaid, 
and all other plans and programs that provide health benefits funded directly or 
indirectly by the United States.”
112
 This exclusion applies to the excluded 
person, anyone who employs the excluded person, and anyone else with whom 
the excluded person comes in contact with through his employment.
113
 The 
result of exclusion would be tremendous losses to any health care professional 
or company because Medicaid and Medicare patients bring in the majority of 
most practice’s revenues.
114




a. Constitutional Considerations on the Award of Damages under the 
FCA 
In addition to 8th Amendment concerns for civil fines discussed earlier,
116
 
Mackby, 261 F.3d. at 821, there are also other Constitutional considerations 
that constrain the amount of settlements against Big Pharma. These include 
Due Process considerations for awarding excessive punitive damages. 
Remedies and punitive damages scholarship generally have argued for 
three different purposes that damages serve in civil and criminal law. Damages 
 
 110 Thomas & Schmidt, Glaxo Agrees to Pay $3 Billion in Fraud Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/business/glaxosmithkline-agrees-to-pay-3-billion-in-fraud-
settlement.html?_r=0. 
 111 Exclusions FAQ, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., 
https://oig.hhs.gov/faqs/exclusions-faq.asp (last visited on Feb. 10, 2016). 
 112 Id.  
 113 Id. 
 114 U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 24. 
 115 See, Frakt, et al., supra note 62.  
 116 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
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seek to compensate the party injured, seek to deter future conduct, and seek 
some punishment or retribution against the wrongdoer, separate and apart from 
deterrence.
117
 Some scholars have argued that retribution or punishment is 
inappropriate to consider in deciding damages because it is a non-rational 
factor that should be picked up in any accurate deterrence calculation.
118
 So, 
Polinsky and Shavell argue that if a fact finder would calculate damages by 
factoring in a multiplier that makes getting caught a certainty, then deterrence 
would provide the adequate incentives in the market place and there would be 
no need for retribution.
119
 It has been argued elsewhere, that focus on the 
damage caused by the actor may not get at the right level of deterrence.
120
 In 
cases of Big Pharma, deterrence based on compensation is inadequate for a 
number of reasons. Looking at deterrence from the perspective of damage 
caused by the actor may not adequately deter the conduct especially where the 
law restricts consideration of damages to the jurisdiction where the action is 
brought, or by limiting class action remedies to narrow groups of injured 
parties rather than to the damages caused by the actions to society more 
broadly, or, as in the case of the FCA, where the consideration of 
consequential damages—including the cost of treating physical injury caused 




Recent Supreme Court cases illustrate the problems. The majority in State 
Farm v. Campbell, narrowed its focus to the damage the defendant caused one 
individual, the plaintiff, and did not consider the damage the defendant caused 
a group of individuals—not parties to the case—within the State of Utah.
122
 To 
Justice Ginsburg, this restricted the punitive damages too narrowly,
123
 As a 
result it had too small an effect, meaning that—punitive damages would not 
adequately deter future insurers from employing practices that would damage a 
wide group of individuals for disparate types of damages. In other words, the 
incentives to the company to defraud its insurers by denying them coverage 
were not adequately set by focusing only on deterrence. The majority argued 
 
 117 See generally DOUGLAS LAYLOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, 16 (Aspen Law & Bus. ed., 3rd ed. 
2002); BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-586 (1996). 
 118 See Paul Zwier, The Utility of a Nonconsequentialist Rationale for Civil-Jury-Awarded Punitive 
Damages, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 403, 404-47 (2006) (for a review of these arguments). 
 119 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 869, 890-91 (1998).  
 120 Zwier, supra note 121. 
 121 Id. 
 122 State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003).  
 123 See id. at 438 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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that retribution could be used to pick up the limits placed on the fact-finder in 
figuring damages that were caused.
124
 The Court held that due process did 
allow for a decision about the amount of punitive damages to include a 
“retribution” factor. A retribution factor might justify a high multiplier of 
compensatory to punitive damages. The Court signaled, however, in a footnote 
that punitive damages would seldom exceed 10 times the amount of 
compensatory damages awarded in a case.
125
 
In a subsequent case, Phillip Morris, USA, v. Williams,
 
Justice Breyer 
attempted to describe how the jury could consider the total amount of the harm 
done generally to help it value the retribution factor, without considering 
damages done to people outside the jurisdiction.
126
 Justice Breyer wrote: 
The Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages 
award to punish a defendant for injury inflicted on strangers to the 
litigation. For one thing, a defendant threatened with punishment for 
such injury has no opportunity to defend against the charge. See 
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 S.S. 56, 66, 92 S.Ct. 862, 31 L. Ed. 2d 36. 
For another, permitting such punishment would add a near 
standardless dimension to the punitive damages equation and 
magnify the fundamental due process concerns of this Court’s 
pertinent cases—arbitrariness, uncertainty, and lack of notice. 
Finally, the Court finds no authority to support using punitive 
damages awards to punish a defendant for harming others. False 
Respondent argues that showing harm to others is relevant to a 
different part of the punitive damages constitutional equation, 
namely, reprehensibility. While evidence of actual harm to nonparties 
can help to show that the conduct that harmed the plaintiff also posed 
a substantial risk to the general public, and so was particularly 
reprehensible, a jury may not go further and use a punitive damages 
verdict to punish a defendant directly for harms to those nonparties. 
Given the risks of unfairness, it is constitutionally important for a 
court to provide assurance that a jury is asking the right question; and 
given the risks of arbitrariness, inadequate notice, and imposing one 
State’s policies on other States, it is particularly important that States 





 124 See id. at 439, n.1. 
 125 See id. 
 126 Philip Morris USA, v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007).  
 127 See id. at 347. 
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In practice, however, this nuance is elusive at best.
128
 What is missing from the 
traditional analysis is that profit is motivating the decision-maker to take 
inappropriate risks with the health and safety of the public, whether it be in his 
or her defrauding the public in mislabeling drugs, or selling defective drugs, or 
creating long term risks to the markets generally. Profit, in the way of money 
that has been stolen from others, including the government, is a measure of 
how much the society has been damaged. Profit is not the flipside of harm. It is 
itself a measure of the harm or damages. Especially when traditional damage 
calculations have been limited by other procedural rules, taking away profits or 
multiples of profits that came to the defendant is the only adequate deterrence 
mechanism that can operate in the marketplace. 
A focus on taking away profits, or multiples of profits also provides the 
notice and constitutional protections the court worries are lacking in other 
calculations that focus on harm. The notice to the defendant is simply this: we 
will calculate how much you have profited from your lie or deceit, and take 
that away from you, even where your profits exceed the damages you have 
caused to a particular plaintiff or relator. 
In addition, a fact-finder’s use of profit as a factor in determining damages 
that was done to society generally gets at the current difficulties of regulating 
market incentive to value short-term gains against “tail-end” risks. The market 
currently is set up to value short-term gains over long-term risks. The corporate 
decision makers are usually long gone before the corporate fraud is revealed. 
The shareholders are not adequately incentivized during the short run to 
monitor for fraud, because shareholder desires for short-term profits are 
aligned with management. 
In any event, current Constitutional holdings prohibit taking profits as a 
measure of punishment, without taking into account other due process 
principles, (size of fines, ratio to compensatory damages, and need for 
retribution.) Where consequential damages are not part of the equation under 
the FCA, the ability of the court to consider them in determining the need for 
retribution is substantially hampered. Using them as a damages variable to 
treble the amount of profits the company has and will obtain from its behavior, 
is not part of the equation. In other words, corporate fraud—whether 
 
 128 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Perhaps well intentioned to try to provide consistency between capital 
punishment considerations and punitive damages, the different contexts of these jury decisions justifies 
treating punishment decisions putting people to death for crimes differently for decisions that try to deter 
institutional decision-makers from harming the public in its desire for profits.  
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concerning Medicare and Medicaid fraud by pharmaceutical companies, or 
fraud by government contractors—is not adequately deterred by market forces, 
if damages are calculated in relationship to direct harm done to the 
government. Government regulation is too little too late, and Big Pharma is 
encouraged to see the end game as its ability to establish a market for its drugs. 
The morality of the market that values short-term profits over long risks is left 
undeterred. 
4. Criminal Sanctions under Anti-Racketeering Statutes.
129
 
Finally, what is theoretically on the table during the settlement of claims 
against Big Pharma are Federal Anti-Racketeering Statutes. Typically, these 
fall out of the discussion during the resolution of cases involving FCA or kick-
back pricing schemes. Perhaps this is because of burden of proof claims 
(beyond a reasonable doubt) or difficulties wrapped up in proving criminal 
intent. You can see from an examination of these claims that the companies 
and their executives deny any criminal wrongdoing, and the sanctions 
associated with that wrongdoing are not invoked. Denying one of these major 
players access to a market, or forfeiture of profits, or requiring anyone to 




5. Who are the Parties in Big Pharma Cases and How Do Their 
Motivations Impact on Deterrence? 
a. The Role of Whistleblower 
In the world of these settlements, the U.S. Attorney is relying in part on the 
whistleblowers and their counsel. The FCA provides that where a qualifying 
whistleblower is involved, that person is entitled to a “relator share” for 
blowing the whistle on the company’s wrongdoing.
131
 The whistleblower, or 
relator, is entitled to a bounty of up to    percent of the government’s 
 
 129 RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization) prohibits the acquisition of any enterprise 
through the investment of racketeering proceeds, as well as the acquisition or operation of an enterprise 
through a pattern of racketeering activities. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988), (providing for 
forfeiture of the “racketeers’ “ interest in the enterprise along with a 20-year sentence for the violation of any 
of the RICO subsections); 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2012); see G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud in Context: 
Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237 (1982). 
 130 See Frakt et al., supra note 62. There is no settlement discussed in the document.  
 131 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012). 
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recovery.
132
 As a result, the relator has a statutory interest in the case which the 
Supreme Court has noted as the justification for meeting the U.S. Const. 
Article III ‘injury in fact” standing requirement.
133
 
The relator may have taken substantial personal risk to expose the fraud 
and the harm to the public as a result of the fraud. When the relationship 
works, the relator and his/her counsel work closely with the DOJ starting with 
the provision of a disclosure statement, which is the road map for the 
investigation. The statement provides an index of relevant documents, 
identifies witnesses and lays out the facts, and legal theories. The disclosure 
statement is a document that can be handed off to any government agent 
assigned to the case. 
Whistleblower’ complaints must meet both the “specificity” requirements 
of FRCP 9(b) and comply with the overall pleading standards established by 
the Supreme Court in Iqbal and Twombly.
134
 This means that the investigation 
and fact-finding should be “front loaded” to meet pleading requirements. 
Again, where the damages recoverable are simply financial, the recovery is 
fairly straightforward. The U.S. wants the return of the money it paid for the 
drug, up to three-times. However, when the amount it paid does not 
compensate the harm done to the public by the fraud, how should the damages 
be calculated? 
From the perspective of the U.S. Attorney one can see how criminal plea-
bargaining experiences can affect the amount of these settlements. The U.S. 
Attorney is affected by his ability to prove the case. So, the prosecuting 
attorney discounts down from the total amount of the fine to take into account 
problems with proving knowledge of falsity and materiality. Second, the U.S. 
Attorney is concerned about the market. In some ways the government has an 
interest in market stability and the perception that the market is clean. So, 
settling a case for less settles the market and brings it certainty, which is good 
for the market, and decreases volatility. Finally, the U.S. government has a 
tricky political problem. It wants to punish bad actors but protect U.S. business 
interests. Many pensions and unions, states, and institutions may own stock in 
the institution that it is investigating. Putting these companies out of business 
often will harm investors. Moreover, like a plaintiff attorney, it wants to cover 
 
 132 Id. 
 133 See Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000).  
 134 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 525 U.S. 366 (2007).  
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its costs in the suit. So, while at a minimum it wants to cover its own costs of 
investigation, it does not represent the individual harmed. They may have 
separate suits for fraud and wrongful death, but these victims may not even 
know that they have such claims. Any fund created to compensate those that 
may have been harmed are expensive to administer and often beyond the 
expertise of the Justice Department. The temptation is to settle the case without 
requiring an admission of guilt on the part of the defendant.
135
 
b. U.S. Attorney’s Guidelines in Settlement 
Should there be published guidelines, or an internal-factors analysis for use 
by the U.S. Attorney’s Office charged with negotiating settlements with 
defendants in whistleblower cases in order to bring about more transparency 
and help develop settlements that lead to better deterrence? The need to get the 
amount of the settlement right is vital to the integrity or rule of law effects as a 
result of these settlements. If the settlement is too low, the settlement can soon 
appear to be the cost of doing business; in the worst case a bribe to permit the 
actor to get away with its profits for the illegal activity. If the settlement cannot 
be correlated to other settlements, then it also can look to the public as if it is a 
result of some special deal or political favor. In other words, it is important for 
the DOJ to develop a set of criteria to evaluate and guide settlement. Currently 
no such guidance exists. 
What factors should the DOJ take into account when determining what 
position it ought to take with regard to monetary settlements?
136
 
1. What is the amount of gross revenue the defendant made as a 
result of its wrongful conduct? 
2. Can “cash” be seized? 
3. Does taking a fine per false certification, trebled, produce an 
amount that approximates the expected gross revenue from the 
activity? 
4. Is the defendant a repeat offender? Or does the institution show 
any indication that it considers its duty to tell the truth fundamental 
 
 135 Edward Wyatt, Settlements Without Admissions Get Security, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/business/neither-admit-nor-deny-settlements-draw-judges-
scrutiny.html?_r=0. 
 136 See Brian C. Elmer & Alan W.H. Gourley, FCA SETTLEMENTS: A Practical Guide For Defense 
Counsel, CROWELL MORING, http://www.crowell.com/documents/DOCASSOCFKTYPE_ 
PRESENTATIONS_440.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2015) (arguing there are no guidelines for the Justice 
Department for FCA settlements). 
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to the workings of an effective market place? For example, during 
discovery or investigation, did the government learn that the 
officers of the organization approved of the illegal activity? Did 
they try to bribe the whistleblower into not revealing its fraud? Did 
the defendant—or its employees—obstruct justice during the fact 
investigation process? Was the whistleblower threatened or 
intimidated? Did they cooperate with the investigation, and make 
available pertinent information in order to determine whether the 
certifications they were making were true or false? 
5. Did the conduct cause harm to the market? 
6. Did the fraud cause consequential harm and or the deaths of 
others? 
7. Was the conduct analogous to a RICO violation, in that it involved 
a conspiracy to lie, and then cover up over a period of time in 
order that they could maximize their profits while they stole from 
those who did not know about the lie? Did they try payoffs, 
bonuses, or kickbacks to prolong the fraud? 
8. Will the company have gained from their actions an advantage in 
the market for its drug that will produce future benefits beyond 
whatever they have to pay in terms of damages for past false 
claims? 
The problem, however, with this factors analysis is that the decision lies with 
the DOJ in individual cases, and there is a lack of information from case-to-
case (unless the same whistleblower attorney is involved or the same Justice 
Department attorney involved) so that the U.S. attorney can act consistently 
across cases. Again our analysis of settlements reached since 2001 shows little 
rhyme or reason in the amount of settlements.
137
 Even where the settlements 
were in the hundreds of millions of dollars, these settlements seemed to have 
little impact on the company’s stock price, ability to continue to market the 
drug, or future market strategies.
138
 
Perhaps some help in incentivizing new tougher standards that might come 
from the Park Doctrine (also known as the Responsible Corporate Officer 
Doctrine).
139
 The Park Doctrine has long occupied an obscure corner of 
 
 137 See Table infra, pp. 118-137. 
 138 Id. 
 139 See Park, 421 U.S. 658; Cory L. Andrews & Richard A. Samp, Restraining Park Doctrine 
Prosecutions Against Corporate Officials Under the FDCA, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY (Sept. 19, 2015), 
http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/restraining-park-doctrine-prosecutions-against-corporate-officials-
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American criminal law. It allows corporate officers to be charged with a crime 
for wrongdoing that occurred “on their watch,” without any showing of 
personal fault or even knowledge on their part—other than a showing that they 
were “in charge” at the time the wrongdoing occurred.
140
 Such no-fault crimes 
are rare in American jurisprudence, but the Supreme Court has upheld such 
convictions under narrow circumstances.
141
 At least one Court of Appeals has 
recently ruled that it did apply in a case of egregious behavior by a small 
pharmaceutical company.
142
 Perhaps this will be the start then of the Justice 
Department thinking of taking an approach that seeks disgorgement of any and 
all profits from the sale of a drug promoted through off-label marketing or 
kick-backs. 
Let’s take a second example from the pharmaceutical industry and see if 
the Park Doctrine might apply. Let’s say a pharmaceutical company markets 
an antiepileptic drug for “off-label” purposes. Though the drug is approved to 
treat seizures, the manufacturer markets the drug to nursing homes to sedate 
patients with dementia. To get the drug into the nursing home market, the 
manufacturer pays market share rebates to the long-term care pharmacies that 
encourage nursing home doctors to try the drug to sedate patients with 
dementia. The off-label use of the drug is synergistic for both the manufacturer 
and the nursing home. The manufacturer expands its revenue stream, and the 
nursing home can cut staff by sedating the patients. While the scheme has 
economic benefits for the manufacturer, the nursing home, and the long term 
care pharmacy that skims an extra profit, sedated patient’s face the risk that 
they will fall, roll out of bed, and live on their remaining years in a sedated 
state. It is a scheme that costs the government, which pays the bills for a drug 
that should not have been prescribed. It is a scheme that causes the government 
to pay for nursing home services that may not meet quality of care standards as 
staffing has been cut. It is a scheme that places patients at risk and bonus 
checks in the hands officials at the drug company, the long term care pharmacy 
and the potentially the nursing home. 
 
under-the-fdca; Dahlia Rin, John P. Pucci, & Robert L. Ullmann, The Misinterpretation of the Park Doctrine 
as Creating Strict Liability, FDLI UPDATE 8, 9 (Nov. 2011), http://www.nxtbook.com/ygsreprints/FDLI/ 
g22793fdli_novdec/index.php?startid=8 (criticizing the Justice Department and FDA’s interpretation of the 
Park Doctrine). We argue that better deterrence can occur if the government can recoup the profits from the 
product that have occurred and will occur in the future. Here is where the Justice Department might perform a 
unique role in settling damages claims where the public has been lied to, there has been harm, and there are 
decision makers who have profited from the activity. 
 140 Id.  
 141 Id.  
 142 See Friedman v. Sebelius, 686 F.3d 813 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  
ZWIER_GUTTMAN GALLEYSFINAL 2/17/2016 11:43 AM 
94 EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW [Vol. 3 
The above example is not atypical. Unlawful marketing practices are not 
just about calculating lost dollars. The practices have real patient impact; 
people are being caused to ingest products that may cause physical harm. 
Though these wrongs are perceived of as white-collar crimes or civil frauds, 
they can also be analyzed through the traditional lens of the tort of “battery” as 
in an unpermitted contact. Often the patient, as in the nursing home example, 
lacks the ability to engage in informed consent or make a decision about his or 
her treatment. The result is litigation under the FCA that really involves the 
subject of elder abuse. In these cases, at least, the Park Doctrine is an 
appropriate consideration. 
c. Alternatives to Liability Under the FCA: Corporate Integrity 
Agreements 
CIAs are contracts negotiated between a corporation and the Office of 
Inspector General of the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services to promote compliance with the statutes, regulations, and written 
directives of Medicare, Medicaid, and all other federal healthcare programs.
143
 
These negotiated settlements are essentially a chance at redemption.
144
 As part 
of a deferred prosecution agreement, the DOJ will ask the defendant 
corporation to enter into a CIA to police its own behavior.
145
 These agreements 
are usually a stipulation of settlement agreements providing for release of 
liability under the FCA. As a result of release of liability, the government 
agrees not to seek the company’s “exclusion from participation in Medicare, 
Medicaid, and other federal healthcare programs.”
146
 
“Although the terms and conditions of these CIAs vary depending on the 
nature and extent of the alleged fraudulent or abusive activity, they have many 
similar elements.”
147
 According to the OIG, CIAs typically contain a duration 
 
 143 See Corporate Integrity Agreements, HEALTH LAW RESOURCES, https://www.healthlawyers.org/ 
hlresources/Health%20Law%20Wiki/Corporate%20Integrity%20Agreements%20(CIAs).aspx (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2016).  
 144 Corporate Integrity Agreements, METRICSTREAM, http://www.metricstream.com/industries/healthcare/ 
corporate-integrity-agreements-compliance.htm (last visited on Feb. 10, 2016). 
 145 Caroline Poplin, Corporate Integrity Agreements: Asking the Companies to Police Themselves, Please, 
WHISTLEBLOWERLAWS (Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.whistleblowerlaws.com/corporate-integrity-agreements-
asking-the-companies-to-police-themselves-please/. 
 146 Corporate Integrity Agreements, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. U.S DEP’T OF HUMAN AND HEALTH 
SERV., http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/corporate-integrity-agreements/ (last visited on Feb. 10, 2016). 
 147 Thomas Herrmann, Meeting the Challenge of Corporate Integrity Agreements and Independent Review 
Organizations, COMPLIANCE.COM (Jan. 2013), http://compliance.com/challenge-of-corporate-integrity-
agreements-and-independent-review-organizations.  
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requirement of five years and include requirements to hire a compliance officer 
and/or appoint a compliance committee, develop written standards and 
policies, implement a comprehensive employees’ training program, retain an 
independent review organization to conduct annual reviews, establish a 
confidential disclosure program, restrict employment of ineligible people, 
report overpayments, reportable events, and ongoing investigations/legal 
proceedings, and provide an implementation report and annual reports to OIG 
on the status of the entity’s compliance activities.
148
 
For example, Johnson & Johnson’s CIA mandates that the company make 
changes to current executive pay structure in an effort to effectuate change in 
corporate behavior.
149
 The OIG hopes that by imposing non-monetary 
measures and requiring compliance with CIAs, the agreement will increase 
accountability among key players and foster transparency.
150
 The five-year 
CIA implemented as a result of Johnson & Johnson’s      settlement with the 
DOJ supersedes an existing CIA in place.
151
 This begs the question of whether 
these agreements are essentially toothless. Between the civil and criminal 
complaint, Johnson & Johnson ultimately settled over six allegations of 
egregious misbehavior, all occurring while Johnson & Johnson had a CIA in 
place.
152
 This would seem to suggest that the CIAs are not particularly 
effective, at least with some of the major pharmaceutical companies. 
In another settlement, Daiichi agreed to enter into a CIA, mandating that 
the company implement compliance reforms for the next five years.
153
 As 
Daiichi is the most recent settlement reached, we see some changes that were 
not present in former CIAs.
154
 Notably, unlike most other CIAs, Daiichi 
refused to implement a new financial incentive structure for its sales 
representatives.
155
 However, the new trend in these agreements, which is 
included in Daiichi’s CIA, is the monitoring and oversight of the company’s 
 
 148 Id. 
 149 Thomas & Schmidt, supra note 113. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Thomas Sullivan, Johnson and Johnson 2013 Settlement and Corporate Integrity Agreement, POLICY 
AND MEDICINE (Nov. 5, 2013), available at http://www.policymed.com/2013/11/johnson-and-johnson-2013-
settlement-and-corporate-integrity-agreement.html; The False Claims Act: A Primer, supra note 90.  
 152 See generally id.; Thomas & Schmidt, supra note 113. 
 153 Thomas Sullivan, Daiichi Sankyo Settlement and Corporate Integrity Agreement, POLICY & MEDICINE 
(Jan. 13, 2015, 05:30:00 AM), http://www.policymed.com/2015/01/daiichi-sankyo-agrees-to-pay-39-million-
to-resolve-off-label-and-kickback-allegations-enters-into-co.html. 
 154 See id. 
 155 Id. 
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social media presence.
156
 Companies are now expected to also watch what they 
disseminate in posts as direct-to-consumer marketing.
157
 
How exactly are CIAs implemented? Most companies implement a 
compliance program and designate a compliance officer and/or a compliance 
committee to ensure that the objectives of the CIA are being accomplished.
158
 
The CIA typically requires the filing of reports certifying compliance with the 
terms of the CIA every year.
159
 CIAs cover the conduct of all owners, 
excluding shareholders owning a negligible amount, officers, directors, 
employees who are engaged in activities relating to federal health programs, 
and it also extends to third parties that are engaged in or have job 
responsibilities relating to the sale of or billing for items or services payable by 
the federal health programs.
160
 Some CIAs impose a cut-off for certain part-
time employees. 
The government is trying to accomplish several important goals with CIAs 
and other regulations placed on health care companies. CIAs are intended to 
improve the overall quality of health care experienced by patients and to 
promote adherence to the current healthcare regulations.
161
 It is important to 
protect the general public from proscribed practices and attempt to hold 
accountable those who commit healthcare fraud.
162
 Another worthy goal of 
CIAs and prosecution by the government of healthcare companies is to 




There are several ways in which the government hopes to effectuate 
compliance with CIAs.
164
 One such way is by requiring the companies’ 
individual committees to meet, sometimes quarterly, to review and oversee the 
compliance program. Another is for each reporting period to have the board 
adopt a resolution signed by each member summarizing its review and 
oversight of the company’s compliance with Federal health care program 
 
 156 See id. 
 157 See id. 
 158 See, e.g., Corporate Integrity Agreement Between the Office Inspector General of the Department of 
Health and Human Services and Johnson & Johnson, 1, 6 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. (2013), http://oig.hhs. 
gov/fraud/cia/agreements/Johnson_Johnson_10312013.pdf.  
 159 See, e.g., id. at 53. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Sullivan, supra note 154.  
 162 See The False Claims Act: A Primer, supra note 90.  
 163 Id. 
 164 Poplin, supra note 148. 
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requirements and the obligations of their particular CIA. This is done in an 
effort to hold each director or officer personally liable for ensuring 
compliance. In the alternative, if the board is unable to provide such a 
conclusion in its resolution, the board shall provide a written explanation of the 
reasons for why it is unable to certify compliance and the steps the company 
will take in order to implement an effective compliance program. 
Some CIAs require changes to executive compensation programs, 
including claw-back of annual bonuses or other long-term incentives. This 
requirement would apply to current and former executives. CIAs may also 
require more transparency in reporting on research practices, publications, 
social media presence, and payments to doctors. 
The effect of non-compliance with an internal CIA, whether it was entered 
into voluntarily or involuntarily, is essentially the same consequences as if the 
company had been prosecuted through the adjudication process.
165
 If a CIA is 
breached, the OIG reserves the right to impose additional sanctions including 
monetary penalties and permissive exclusion from all Federal healthcare 
programs.
166
 Yet, the fines associated with such violation are much lower, 
usually ranging from $1,000 to $2,500 per violation.
167
 
Since May of 2009, CIAs have been a part of most settlements between Big 
Pharma and the Justice Department. At that time the Fraud Enforcement and 
Recovery Act of       “FERA”  was signed into law, implementing the most 
significant amendments to the FCA since 1986.
168
 Furthermore, in March of 
2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was signed into law by 
President Obama, further amending and broadening the scope of the FCA.
169
 
Since the enactment of these two laws, countless other settlements, besides the 
four large ones described above, have contributed to over $7 billion dollars in 




 165 See The False Claims Act: A Primer, supra note 90. 
 166 Exclusions FAQ, supra note 114. 
 167 Poplin, supra note 148. 
 168 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012). 
 169 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012). 
 170 Companies seem to pass on the costs of these settlements to the future price they charge for the drug, 
despite the practices they used to establish the drug’s place in the market. They also use the settlement as a 
new “development cost,” getting the double benefit of a tax write off, and a justification for setting a higher 
wholesale price, going forward. These troubling examples, in chronological order, include companies such as: 
1. Eli Lilly*; $1.415 billion; for its off-label promotion of Zyprexa; settled in January 2009 (Eli Lilly 
and Company Agrees to Pay $1.415 Billion to Resolve Allegations of Off-label Promotion of 
Zyprexa, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 15, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2009/January/ 
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09-civ-038.html). Eli raised its price following the settlement of Zyprexa and its other drugs. 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/lilly-q1-price-rises-end-of-zyprexa-woes-boost-the-numbers/. 
2. Alpharma; $42.5 million; off-label promotion of Kadian; March 2010 (Alpharma to Pay $42.5 
Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations in Connection with Promotion of Drug Kadian, 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (March 16, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alpharma-pay-425-million-
resolve-false-claims-act-allegations-connection-promotion-drug). Following settlement extended 
patent by developing an extended release capsule. Raised price of drug. 100 mg capsule 
(manufactured by Actavis, NDC 46987-0324-11) with AWP of $21.1193 per capsule, Annual cost 
of regimen = $22,808.84,Cost of regimen over claimant’s life expectancy = $684,265.20. The 
generic competitor set its price close to Kadians initial price. Conversion to Generic Morphine 
Sulfate Extended-Release 300mg per day, 100mg capsule (manufactured by Watson Pharma, NDC 
00591-3453-01) with AWP of $18.2471 per capsule, Annual cost of regimen = $19,706.87, Cost 
of regimen over claimant’s life expectancy = $591,206.10 (FDA Approves Generic Equivalents of 
Kadian, MEDVAL (Dec. 7, 2011) https://www.medval.com/2011/12/07/fda-approves-generic-
equivalents-of-kadian/. 
3. AstraZeneca*; $520 million; off-label promotion of Seroquel; illegal kick-backs; settled in April 
2010 (Pharmaceutical Giant AstraZeneca to Pay $520 Million for Off-label Drug Marketing, 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 27, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/pharmaceutical-giant-
astrazeneca-pay-520-million-label-drug-marketing). Consumer Reports reported at 88% raise in 
the average retail prescription price of Seroquel for its 2007 price to 2012. Knowing when 
Prescription Prices are high and how to avoid Overspending, CONSUMER REPORTS (Nov. 2012), 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/2012/11/where-high-drug-costs-hide/index.htm. 
4. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen; $81 million; off-label marketing of Topamax; settled in April 2010 (Two 
Johnson & Johnson Subsidiaries to Pay Over $81 Million to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label 
Promotion of Topamax, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-
johnson-johnson-subsidiaries-pay-over-81-million-resolve-allegations-label-promotion). Raised its 
price for name brand, and then raised the price to over $200 a prescription or over double generic 
prices. Best Buy Drugs, CONSUMER REPORTS, https://www.consumerreports.org/health/resources/ 
pdf/best-buy-drugs/Anticonvulsants-FINAL.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2016).  
5. Novartis*; $72.5 million; off-label promotion of TOBI; illegal kick-backs; settled in May 2010 
(Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics to Pay More Than $72 Million to Resolve False Claims Act 
Allegations Concerning TOBI, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May 4, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
novartis-vaccines-diagnostics-pay-more-72-million-resolve-false-claims-act-allegations). Extends 
patent for “Podhaler” TOBI (treating cystic fibrosis) and raises prices. FDA approves Novartis 
TOBI® Podhaler™ for certain cystic fibrosis patients, the first and only dry powder inhaled 
antibacterial in US, FIERCE PHARMA (MARCH 25, 2013), http://www.fiercepharma.com/press-
releases/fda-approves-novartis-tobi-podhaler-certain-cystic-fibrosis-patients-first-0.  
6. Allergan*; $600 million; off-label promotion of Botox; settled in September 2010 (Allergan 
Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay $600 Million to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of 
Botox®, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/allergan-agrees-plead-
guilty-and-pay-600-million-resolve-allegations-label-promotion-botox). Price increases held to 3% 
a year till last year. See Cafépharmaceutical message boards, http://cafepharma.com/boards/ 
threads/botox-price-increase-again.572609/. 
7. Forest Laboratories*; $313 million; off-label promotion of Levothroid, Celexa, and Lexapro; 
settled in September 2010 (Drug Maker Forest Pleads Guilty; To Pay More Than $313 Million to 
Resolve Criminal Charges and False Claims Act Allegations, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 15, 2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/drug-maker-forest-pleads-guilty-pay-more-313-million-resolve-
criminal-charges-and-false). 
8. Novartis*; $422.5 million; off-label promotion of Trileptal; settled in September 2010 (Novartis 
Pharmaceuticals Corp. to Pay More Than $420 Million to Resolve Off-label Promotion and 
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Kickback Allegations, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/novartis-
pharmaceuticals-corp-pay-more-420-million-resolve-label-promotion-and-kickback). 
9. Kos Pharmaceuticals; $41 million; off-label promotion of Advicor and Niaspan; settled in 
December 2010 (Kos Pharmaceuticals to Pay More Than $41 Million to Resolve Kickback and 
Off-Label Promotion Allegations, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
kos-pharmaceuticals-pay-more-41-million-resolve-kickback-and-label-promotion-allegations). 
10. Elan*; $203 million; off-label promotion of Zonegran; settled in December 2010 (Pharmaceutical 
Companies to Pay $214.5 Million to Resolve Allegations of Off-label Promotion of Zonegran, 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/pharmaceutical-companies-pay-
2145-million-resolve-allegations-label-promotion-zonegran). 
11. Dey Pharma LP; $280 million; inflating published drug prices; settled in December 2010 
(Pharmaceutical Manufacturer to Pay $280 Million to Settle False Claims Act Case, DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE (Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/pharmaceutical-manufacturer-pay-280-
million-settle-false-claims-act-case). 
12. UCB*; $34 million; off-label promotion of Keppra; settled in June 2011 2011 (U.S. Subsidiary of 
Belgian Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Pleads Guilty to Off-Label Promotion; Company to Pay 
More Than $34 Million, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 9, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-
subsidiary-belgian-pharmaceutical-manufacturer-pleads-guilty-label-promotion-company-pay). 
13. Novo Nordisk*; $25 million; off-label promotion of NovoSeven; settled in June 2011 (Danish 
Pharmaceutical Novo Nordisk to Pay $25 Million to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion 
of Novoseven, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 10, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/danish-
pharmaceutical-novo-nordisk-pay-25-million-resolve-allegations-label-promotion). 
14. Pfizer*; $14.5 million; off-label promotion of Detrol; settled in October 2011(Pfizer to Pay $14.5 
Million for Illegal Marketing of Drug Detrol, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www. 
justice.gov/opa/pr/pfizer-pay-145-million-illegal-marketing-drug-detrol). 2012-2015 average 
increase of branded drugs, 14.33 percent; Massive, unexpected drug price increases are happening 
all the time, QUARTZ (Oct. 1, 2015), http://qz.com/514553/massive-unexpected-drug-price-
increases-are-happening-all-the-time/. 
15. Merck, Sharp & Dohme*; $441 million; off-label marketing of Vioxx and false statements about 
the drug’s cardiovascular safety; April 2012 (U.S. Pharmaceutical Company Merck Sharp & 
Dohme Sentenced in Connection with Unlawful Promotion of Vioxx, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 15, 
2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-pharmaceutical-company-merck-sharp-dohme-sentenced-
connection-unlawful-promotion-vioxx). 2012-2015 Merck’s average increase of branded drugs, 
9.9 percent. Massive, unexpected drug price increases are happening all the time, QUARTZ (Oct. 1, 
2015), http://qz.com/514553/massive-unexpected-drug-price-increases-are-happening-all-the-
time/. 
16. GlaxoSmithKline*; $1.043 billion; off-label promotion of Paxil, Wellbutrin, Advair, Lamictal, 
Zofran; settled in July 2012 (GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to Resolve 
Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety Data, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 2, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/glaxosmithkline-plead-guilty-and-pay-3-billion-resolve-fraud-
allegations-and-failure-report). The Wall Street journal reports price increases at Glaxo for name 
brands and generics, for 2015. Ron Winslow, Cost of Skin Drugs Rising Rapidly, Study Shows, 
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Nov. 26, 2015) http://www.wsj.com/articles/prescription-skin-drugs-
explode-in-costs-study-shows-1448467254. 
17. Boehringer Ingelheim*; $95 million; off-label promotion of Aggrenox; settled in October 2012 
(Boehringer Ingelheim to Pay $95 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations, DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/boehringer-ingelheim-pay-95-million-
resolve-false-claims-act-allegations). Price information on Aggrenox not available. 
18. Amgen*; $612 million; off-label promotion of Aranesp, Enbrel, Neulasta; illegal kick-backs; 
settled in December 2012 (Amgen Inc. Pleads Guilty to Federal Charge in Brooklyn, NY.;Pays 
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Of the twenty-four companies that settled with the DOJ within the past 
seven years, seventeen have included a stipulation for implementation of and 
compliance with CIAs as a condition of settlement. (All except for Alpharma, 
Dey Pharma LP, Ortho-McNeil-Janssen, Kos Pharmaceuticals, Wyeth, 
CareFusion, and Sanofi-Aventis).
171
 According to data, there has been a 
dramatic decrease in the number of CIAs in 2014.
172
 However, this can mainly 
be attributed to the fact that the majority of the large pharmaceutical 
companies already have a mandated CIA in place.
173
 Eight out of the ten 
 
$762 Million to Resolve Criminal Liability and False Claims Act Allegations, DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
(Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/amgen-inc-pleads-guilty-federal-charge-brooklyn-
ny-pays-762-million-resolve-criminal). Price information on subject not yet available. 
19. Sanofi-Aventis; $109 million; illegal kick-backs; lowering of effective price of Hyalgan; settled in 
December 2012 (Sanofi US Agrees to Pay $109 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations of 
Free Product Kickbacks to Physicians, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.justice. 
gov/opa/pr/sanofi-us-agrees-pay-109-million-resolve-false-claims-act-allegations-free-product-
kickbacks). Price information on subject not yet available. 
20. Par Pharmaceutical*; $22.5 million; off-label promotion of Megace ES; settled in March 2013 
(Par Pharmaceuticals Pleads Guilty and Agrees to Pay $45 Million to Resolve Civil and Criminal 
Allegations Related to Off-Label Marketing, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (March 5, 2013), http://www. 
justice.gov/opa/pr/par-pharmaceuticals-pleads-guilty-and-agrees-pay-45-million-resolve-civil-and-
criminal). Price information on subject not yet available. 
21. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals; $257.4 million; off-label promotion of Rapamune; settled in July 2013 
(Wyeth Pharmaceuticals Agrees to Pay $490.9 Million for Marketing the Prescription Drug 
Rapamune for Unapproved Uses, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 30, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
pr/wyeth-pharmaceuticals-agrees-pay-4909-million-marketing-prescription-drug-rapamune-
unapproved). Price information on subject not yet available. 
22. CareFusion; $40.1 million; off-label promotion of ChloraPrep; settled in January 2014 
(CareFusion to Pay the Government $40.1 Million to Resolve Allegations That Include More Than 
$11 Million in Kickbacks to One Doctor, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.justice. 
gov/opa/pr/carefusion-pay-government-401-million-resolve-allegations-include-more-11-million-
kickbacks). Price information on subject not yet available. 
23. Endo Pharmaceuticals*; off-label promotion of Lidoderm; settled in February 2014 (Endo 
Pharmaceuticals and Endo Health Solutions to Pay $192.7 Million to Resolve Criminal and Civil 
Liability Relating to Marketing of Prescription Drug Lidoderm for Unapproved Uses, DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/endo-pharmaceuticals-and-endo-health-
solutions-pay-1927-million-resolve-criminal-and-civil). Price information on subject not yet 
available. 
24. Shire Pharmaceuticals*; $56.5 million; off-label promotion, settled in September 2014 (Shire 
Pharmaceuticals LLC to Pay $56.5 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations Relating to 
Drug Marketing and Promotion Practices, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 41, 2014), http://www.justice. 
gov/opa/pr/shire-pharmaceuticals-llc-pay-565-million-resolve-false-claims-act-allegations-
relating-drug). Price information on subject not yet available. 
*Indicates that the company has implemented a CIA as a condition of settlement with the DOJ.  
 171 See id.  
 172 See Sullivan, supra note 154. 
 173 See id. 
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biggest pharmaceutical companies are currently operating under a CIA, and 
some have already violated earlier agreements multiple times.
174
 
There are several issues regarding how CIAs are currently implemented 
and monitored for compliance. One main issue with CIAs is that the 
government is assuming that the internally appointed compliance officer or 
other so-designated person will be able to perform their role objectively and 
without company bias.
175
 These settlements include agreements that all 
criminal and civil charges are dropped, and typically each company refuses to 
admit any fault or wrongdoing.
176
 This is inadequate to accomplish the 
objective of holding directors and officers, the ones in charge calling the shots, 
personally liable in a way that would force them to change their fraudulent 
tactics. For example, Johnson & Johnson expressly denied all allegations and 
further stood behind its promotion of the drug they were charged with 
improperly promoting.
177
 Most importantly, there is no system currently in 
place for the imposition of liability on individual actors, whether criminal or 
civil. No individuals were charged in any of the large pharmaceutical 
settlements of Glaxo, Johnson & Johnson, or Abbott Laboratories.
178
 Officers, 
owners, and directors, the ones that actually implement unlawful policies, are 
able to hide behind the corporate veil. There are only a few instances of any 
personal liability: 
 Synthes: In 2011, four executives were sentenced to less than one 




 A former executive of KV Pharm was sentenced to only thirty 
days in jail and fined $1 million for selling misbranded tablets.
180
 
The previous year, the DHHS excluded him from conducting 




 174 See Maria Szalavitz, Top 10 Drug Company Settlements, Pharma Behaving Badly, TIME (Sept. 17, 
2012), http://healthland.time.com/2012/09/17/pharma-behaving-badly-top-10-drug-company-settlements/. 
 175 See Poplin, supra note 148. 
 176 See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 154. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Thomas & Schmidt, supra note 113. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. (a finding where personal liability was imposed). 
 181 Id. 
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Since the implementation of CIAs many companies may simply consider the 
large settlement payments as just a cost of doing business.
182
 For example, 
Glaxo’s $  billion settlement for a half dozen drugs over    years represents 
only a portion of what Glaxo made on the drugs; 11% to be exact.
183
 
Wellbutrin made the company $5.9 billion, Avandia brought in over $5.9 
billion, and Paxil generated over $11.6 billion.
184
 Three billion dollars seems 
like a drop in the bucket when placed in context. The gaudy sums are unlikely 
to curb the industry’s reliance on fraudulent activities because the practices are 
simply too lucrative to give up.
185
 Eliot Spitzer, former New York Attorney 




CIAs are therefore mostly self-enforcing.
187
 Some have notice provisions 
that require any action taken by the government on the CIA to be preceded by 
notice and a chance for the company to respond.
188
 Because implementation of 
and compliance with CIAs can be very costly, (from having to potentially hire 
an outside reviewer and all the other time and efforts that come along with 
ensuring compliance) one wonders whether those auditing will either be co-
opted, or given other tasks that detract from their focus on searching for illegal 
activity.
189
 The regulations tend to be complex and many companies struggle 
to effectively implement a system to comply with the onerous auditing, 
reporting, and monitoring requirements.
190
 Moreover—and not to be 
overlooked—is that analysis of the big schemes indicates that unlawful 
behavior is driven by facially neutral conduct, which is often hard to detect. 
While CIAs may actually monitor for obvious facially neutral drivers—as in 
bonuses to sales representatives for both on-label and off-label sales—the 
industry has been clever enough to continually develop new ways to drive 
unlawful revenue streams. 
 
 182 Id.  
 183 Id.; Szalavitz, supra note 177. 
 184 Thomas & Schmidt, supra note 113. 
 185 Michael Bobelian, J&J’s $2.2 Billion Settlement Won’t Stop Big Pharma’s Addiction To Off-Label 
Sales, FORBES (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelbobelian/2013/11/12/jjs-2-2-billion-
settlement-wont-stop-big-pharmas-addiction-to-off-label-sales/.  
 186 Thomas & Schmidt, supra note 113.  
 187 See Poplin, supra note 148. 
 188 See id. 
 189 See id. 
 190 See id. 
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CONCLUSION 
The special features of Big Pharma’s ability to dictate the pricing of drugs 
in the U.S. healthcare market creates seemingly insurmountable incentives for 
it to extract exorbitant prices. Traditional common law remedies do not 
provide deterrence. In addition, given the seemingly ineffective results when 
implemented by pharmaceutical companies, an argument can be made that 
CIAs are toothless.
191
 And, one might wonder whether OIG guidelines will 
produce any better results, especially in light of OIG lack of legislative 
authorization for ordering divestitures. Critics argue that damages are not 
enough to deter drug companies from unlawful behavior.
192
 Exclusion from 
Federal healthcare programs has only occurred in a negligible amount of cases 
and never in the case of any of the larger pharmaceutical companies.
193
 The 
OIG might be very reluctant to follow through on its permissive exclusion 
power because of the drastic and far-reaching effect it could have on innocent 
parties, including employees and patients who rely on these drugs.
194
 
Perhaps a new approach will be taken by the OIG that will enforce as a 
consequence of non-compliance the forced divestiture of a business unit or 
product.
195
 Many in the industry believe this move signals the OIG’s 
willingness to achieve compliance through novel uses of its enforcement 
authority.
196
 While seeming like an effective way to scare a company into 
compliance, this could raise serious legal concerns.
197
 Divestiture is not one of 
the enforcement tools specifically granted to the OIG by Congress, and its use 
could be considered an over-reaching and abuse of discretion.
198
 Because it is 
 
 191 See id. 
 192 Thomas & Schmidt, supra note 113. 
 193 See Table infra pp. 118-137. 
 194 John Bentivoglio, Jennifer L. Bragg, Michael K. Loucks, Gregory M. Luce & Alexander R. Cohen, 
Violations of Corporate Integrity Agreement Trigger Divestiture Action by HHS OIG, SKADDEN (June 14, 
2010), http://www.skadden.com/insights/violations-corporate-integrity-agreement-trigger-divestiture-action-
hhs-oig. In an effort to improve the current system regarding CIAs, the OIG held a round table meeting, the 
first of its kind, with representatives of several health care companies, entitled “Focus on Compliance—The 
Next Generation of Corporate Integrity Agreements.” Herrmann, supra note 150. While no specific 
recommendations were proffered as a result of this discussion, it was reported that the health care companies 
urged the OIG to supply additional compliance guidance to the industry. Id. 
 195 Bentivoglio, Bragg, Loucks, Luce & Cohen, supra note 197 (explaining that the OIG forced a 
company that violated its CIA to divest a subsidiary as a condition for the parent to avoid exclusion from 
federal health care programs). 
 196 See id. 
 197 See id. at ¶10. 
 198 See id. (“Congress has provided the OIG with specific enforcement tools, including civil money 
penalties and exclusion, while forced divestiture is not among these enumerated sanctions.”). 
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not among the OIG’s enumerated tools, there is little direction as to how it can 
be utilized or applied across the board, which could lead to very inconsistent 
results.
199
 This recent trend by the OIG could potentially lead to the creation of 
more issues than it is designed to solve. 
Another, seemingly obvious possible solution is to impose heftier fines, 
and make the companies really appreciate the loss associated with their 
wrongdoing.
200
 If companies were forced to write a check for damages that 
resulted in an amount higher than 11% of their annual profit, it might make 
them reconsider their practices.
201
 But this might raise Constitutional concerns, 
if a lost profits variable is not made explicitly part of any remedies that can be 
prescribed. 
There needs to be a regulatory system where individuals are held liable for 
the misconduct they either personally participate in or encourage through their 
numerous sales incentives or the way they train their employees to interact 
with physicians or market their products. Only when prosecutors single out 
individual executives for punishment will practices begin to change.
202
 CIAs 
typically include provisions relating to the OIG’s right to inspect and audit the 
company and its compliance records.
203
 It is not clear how often this task is 
actually undertaken, but following through on the inspection right could lead to 
discovery of non-compliance and false reporting. 
Perhaps, big Pharmaceutical companies should be regulated much like 
public utilities. Like public utilities and water, electricity, heat, there will 
always be a demand for pharmaceutical products. The consumers need them 
and they are fundamental to a meaningful life. If the government further 
regulated the industry’s pricing, as it has in public utilities, this would likely 
promote more competition between companies and drive the prices lower, 
benefitting all, but most importantly, the government in its repayment of 
Medicaid and Medicare pricing. 
The government should also implement stricter regulations regarding the 
actions of a company’s key players. In the spirit of transparency, the 
compliance officer, board of directors, and any other employee responsible for 
compliance should be required to sign compliance certificates, acknowledging 
 
 199 See id. 
 200 See Szalavitz, supra note 177. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Herrmann, supra note 150.  
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that all of the health care requirements have been complied with. As such, each 
signor should be held personally liable for any deviation from or failure to 
comply with such regulations. At that point, it is on each individual to perform 
the necessary investigation confirming that what they are acknowledging has 
actually been complied with. If their signature actually meant they had 
something to lose, it will likely ensure that the standards will actually be met. 
This certification could form the basis of a potential FCA claim and imposition 
of criminal sanctions. 
Since the nature of CIAs are voluntary and allow large companies to avoid 
huge fines and any liability, there should be a give-and-take. This is possibly 
the trend of the future, with at least one company implementing this theory of 
personal liability into its CIAs.
204
 The CIA placed additional liabilities on a 
company’s board of directors, based upon the notion of the duty of care and 
loyalty that such actors owe the company.
205
 
If the government insists on continuing to use CIAs as a way to enforce 
health care regulation compliance, another effective solution would be to 
require an addition of provisions to forthcoming agreements. These provisions 
might provide for greater regulation, including inspections rights, open-book 
requirements, and personal liability, and better transparency regarding the 
setting of prices. This could hopefully accomplish what their predecessors 
failed to: forcing companies to change their current business model and tactics. 
Still, one wonders how these remedies deter the setting of prices in context 
of supply and demand, where supply is often exclusively provided by the 
patent holder and the demand is driven by the health impact of going without 
the drug.
206
 In a society that is extremely distrustful of a government agency 
setting prices, one might wonder whether common law civil remedies can ever 
sufficiently deter against illegal activities. Even in the case of disgorgement, 
the question is who will get the profits. If they go to the government, the 
government has an interest in seeking such remedies. At stake is the distinction 
between private and public ownership of pharmaceuticals. The dilemma then is 
whether disgorgement or forced sales will ever be implemented, or whether 
like the nuclear options, they will ever be used. 
 
 204 Szalavitz, supra note 177. 
 205 Id. 
 206 See David H. Howard, Peter B. Bach, Ernst R. Berndt & Rena M. Conti, Pricing in the Market for 
Anticancer Drugs, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 139, 140, 141 (2015). 
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Perhaps then, Big Pharma is an example of a market where traditional 
remedies just do not work.
207
 But even then troubling questions remain. Do 
single payer options really assist in moderating the price of drugs in the long 
run? Will single payer systems divide the government from the patient and the 
patient’s overall health, and end up bringing about incentives that will not 
provide for sufficient research and development of new drugs. Is the answer 
some sort of pricing regulations? As a result of any of these solutions, will 
overall health care suffer? 
 
 
 207 Id. at 158-159 (suggesting that European or Canadian price referencing may be needed in the U.S., 
especially for cancer-fighting drugs).  
